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A STUDY IN REGULATORY METHOD, 
LOCAL POLIDCAL CULTURES, AND 
JURISPRUDENTIAL VOICE: THE 
APPLICATION OF FEDERAL 
CONFIDENTIALITY LAW TO PROJECT 
HEAD START 
Richard C. Boldt* 
INTRODUCTION 
The problems associated with the abuse of alcohol and other 
drugs have reached into virtually every community in the United 
States. Even discounting for the rhetorical excess that characterizes 
some governmental pronouncements about drugs and alcohol,1 it 
seems clear that the compulsive use of addictive substances has had 
severe deleterious consequences for the lives of many individuals, 
their families, and their communities. Due to a confluence of fac-
tors, however, the corrosive effects of substance abuse have been 
experienced most acutely in the poorest communities, and have 
been borne disproportionately by the most vulnerable members of 
those communities, poor children.2 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland. J.D. 1982, Yale; A.B. 1979, Co-
lumbia College. - Ed. I wish to thank Eileen Canfield and Marc Feldman for their valuable 
suggestions and unfailing support. 
1. See, e.g., OFFICE OF NATL. DRUG CoNIRoL PouCY, EXEcurivE OFFICE OF nm PRES-
IDENT, NATIONAL DRUG CoNIROL STRATEGY 1 {1989); see also JAMES A. INCIARDI, THE 
WAR ON DRUGS: HEROIN, CoCAINE, CiuME, AND PUBUC PouCY (1986). 
2. See RAYMOND C. CoLUNS & PENNY R. ANDERSON, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVICES, HEAD START SUBSTANCE ABUSE GUIDE 3 {1991) {describing the finding 
of the 1990 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, conducted for the National Institute 
on Drug Abuse, that the use of illegal drugs had increased among young adults, African-
Americans, the unemployed, and residents of large metropolitan areas). 
It is important to distinguish between the harmful consequences of substance abuse itself 
and the harms indirectly associated with it, including violence between dealers, adulteration, 
HIV infection, abuse of children, and the like. In part, these harmful effects have been most 
pronounced in poor communities because of a preexisting economic vacuum. In addition, 
the vulnerability of many poor families due to inadequate housing, medical care, and educa-
tional services has only served to exacerbate the harms associated with alcoholism and drug 
addiction. Finally, the role of racism in the drug war should not be overlooked. See John A. 
Powell & Eileen B. Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug War: The National Purse, the Constitu-
tion and the Black Community, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 557 (1991). For a compelling discus-
sion of all these factors, see Kurt L. Schmoke, Testimony submitted to the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs for a hearing on "Oversight of Federal Drug Policy 
Programs Affecting State and Local Government" (Oct. 13, 1989, on file with author); Legal-
ization of Illicit Drugs: Impact and Feasibility, Part 1: Hearing Before House Select Comm. 
2325 
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In the past few years, a number of "target cities" have received 
special funds from the Center For Substance Abuse Treatment 
(CSAT) of the Department of Health and Human Services, to im-
prove the delivery of substance abuse treatment to needy popula-
tions. 3 One of the most important CSAT Target Cities initiatives 
has been a program designed to encourage the development of 
programmatic linkages between substance abuse treatment re-
sources and the local Head Start agencies in a given city.4 Balti-
more, Maryland is among the cities that have received these special 
Head Start funds.s 
In 1991, the Baltimore Urban Services Agency, the Baltimore 
Target Cities grantee, began working with Baltimore City Head 
Start to develop a coordinated strategy for delivering substance 
abuse treatment and prevention services to the families comprising 
the city's Head Start population.6 Essential features of this project 
and others like it have included: the provision of early intervention 
and referral services for Head Start parents abusing alcohol or 
other drugs; the development of support programs for children 
from substance-abusing families; the creation of classroom-based 
strategies for staff members working with children who exhibit the 
physical and psychological effects of exposure to addicted adults; 
and the development of a family-centered case management system 
on Narcotics Abuse and Contro~ lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 188-98 (1988) (testimony of Kurt L. 
Schmoke, Mayor of Baltimore). 
3. The Target Cities Program began in the early 1990s as a $28.5 million undertaking. Its 
goal was to establish cooperative agreements with eight major cities to improve city-wide 
substance abuse treatment systems by developing partnerships to ensure the coordinated de-
livery of services. The program was originally started by CSAT's predecessor agency, The 
Office for Treatment Improvement (OTI). The first eight target cities were Albuquerque, 
Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, New York, and San Juan. In addition, 
the Office for Substance Abuse Prevention (OSAP) of the Department of Health and 
Human Services awarded 95 demonstration grants under its Community Partnership Pro-
gram to assist communities to plan and implement coordinated and comprehensive alcohol 
and drug abuse prevention programs. The Head Start Bureau of the Administration of Chil-
dren and Families within HHS has been working in collaboration with both of these pro-
grams as part of its Substance Abuse Initiative. See Susan Weber, The Head Start Substance 
Abuse Initiative, NAn.. HEAD START Buu.., 1991, at 1. 
4. Head Start is a federally funded program for poor children and their families. See 42 
u.s.c. §§ 9831-9887 (1988). 
5. See Baltimore Urban Services Agency, Building the Capacity of Head Start Programs 
to Address the Issue of Substance Abuse (1991) (grant application, on file with author) 
[hereinafter Baltimore Urban Services Agency, Building the Capacity]; Baltimore Urban 
Services Agency, Collaboration Between Head Start Grantee and Target Cities Programs 
(1991} (grant application, on file with author) [hereinafter Baltimore Urban Services Agency, 
Collaboration]. 
6. Following the completion of a ''needs assessment" and other background research into 
the incidence and effects of drug and alcohol abuse among Head Start families, the grantee 
developed the outlines for a comprehensive demonstration project. 
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in which services directed to children and their substance-abusing 
parents are reinforced and coordinated in a "holistic" approach.7 
Significantly, these projects have relied heavily upon Head Start 
personnel to perform diagnosis, referral, and counseling tasks in ad-
dition to providing the educational components of the plan. In-
deed, not only did the Baltimore plan envision important roles for 
Head Start teachers, social workers, and parent liaisons,s it also 
called for the hiring and training of special case managers responsi-
ble for the coordination of substance abuse treatment services of-
fered to Head Start families.9 
This article focuses on one particular set of issues raised by the 
effort to coordinate the activities of Head Start centers with those 
of substance abuse treatment programs and the introduction of 
treatment and prevention functions into the daily interactions of 
Head Start staff and parents.10 These issues involve the disclosure 
of potentially damaging information about a Head Start parent's 
drug or alcohol abuse and the confidentiality considerations that 
arise when she or he11 has sought or received treatment for that 
abuse. Although it is possible to characterize these issues as techni-
cal, doctrinal questions of statutory and regulatory interpretation, it 
is also possible to understand them as questions of jurisprudential 
method that implicate the relationship between legal theory and 
practice. Stated simply, the problems arise because the system of 
statutes and administrative regulations governing the confidential-
ity of drug and alcohol treatment information assumes that treat-
7. Weber, supra note 3; see also SUSAN WEBER ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF HEAL'IH AND 
HUMAN SERVICES, WORKING Wrm SUBsrANCE ABUSING FAMILIES (1994) (on file with 
author). 
8. Parent liaisons are Head Start staff members whose responsibilities include working 
with parents both as "learners" and as "decisionmakers." For a fuller discussion of the role 
of parents within Head Start, see infra text accompanying notes 48 and 49. 
9. See Baltimore Urban Services Agency, Building the Capacity, supra note 5; see also 
Cou.INs MANAGEMENT CoNsULTING, INc., SUBsrANCE ABusE RELATED NEEDS AssESS-
MENT OF nm BALTIMORE HEAD START PROGRAM: SUMMARY FINDINGS (1991) (on file with 
author). The proposals that led to the funding of Baltimore's demonstration project included 
plans to grant priority access to Head Start services to children of parents in substance abuse 
treatment programs, as well as priority access to drug or alcohol treatment to the parents of 
children already enrolled in Head Start. Id. at 13. 
10. Significantly, the planners of these cooperative undertakings have made clear that 
they are not developing alcohol and drug "treatment programs" within Head Start centers. 
Instead, the projects are described as substance-abuse-related services intended to support 
families with addiction problems "in the context of Head Start's basic child development 
goals." Weber, supra note 3, at 1; see also CoLI.INs & ANDERSON, supra note 2, at 3. 
11. The vast majority of Head Start parents are women. The Substance Abuse Initiative 
activities are directed not only to mothers involved in Head Start, however, but also to other 
family members with drug or alcohol problems who may have contact with Head Start 
children. 
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ment programs will be structured as conventional social service 
agencies, but most Head Start centers are organized around, and 
deeply committed to, a very different set of institutional values. 
Thus, though the governing law with respect to confidentiality 
within the drug and alcohol abuse treatment system depends upon 
clear delineations between professionals and nonprofessionals, 
counselors and clients, individuals and families, the daily practices 
and operative premises of many Head Start centers reject these di-
chotomous categorizations and the values these distinctions 
express.12 
This disjunction between legal premise and concrete reality 
causes law-practice problems,13 but it also provides an opportunity 
for an examination of regulatory methodology, the development of 
localized political culture, and issues of jurisprudential voice. The 
values expressed in the unusual organizational style of many Head 
Start programs reflect not only historical roots stretching back to 
the 1960s "war on poverty," but also the cumulative lived experi-
ence of the groups who have comprised Head Start both as staff 
and as recipients of services. Conventional legal assumptions and 
12. See generally Lucie E. White, No Exil: Rethinking "Welfare Dependency" from a Dif-
ferent Ground, 81 GEO. L.J. 1961, 2001 (1993). 
13. In the spring of 1992, I taught a course at the University of Maryland School of Law 
in which my first-year students engaged in field work representing drug and alcohol abuse 
treatment programs. Although most of the students in this course were assigned to work 
with individual drug and alcohol abuse treatment programs, one team of students spent the 
semester consulting with the Target Cities grantee in Baltimore. For a fuller description of 
this course, see Richard Boldt & Marc Feldman, The Faces of Law In Theory and Practice: 
Doctrine, Rhetoric, and Social Context, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 1111 (1992). 
Building upon an ongoing consulting relationship I had established with the Baltimore 
Target Cities grantee and other grantees around the country, the students assisted me in 
shaping the basic organizational structure of the Head Start Substance Abuse Initiative. This 
required that we balance the participants' need for a free flow of information against legal 
requirements that ordinarily restrict the communication of sensitive data about persons in 
substance abuse treatment. 
The program had been designed with little input from lawyers knowledgeable about the 
statutes and regulations governing the confidentiality of substance abuse treatment records. 
As soon as we became involved with the Baltimore project and the equivalent organizations 
in other grantee cities, we discovered that there were some very serious problems with their 
design. On the one hand, the laws and regulations that govern all federally assisted substance 
abuse treatment providers (including those who hold themselves out as providing diagnosis 
or referral) require that extremely strict safeguards be followed regarding the disclosure of 
patient-identifying information. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 290dd-3, 290ee-3 (1988); 42 
C.F.R. §§ 2.l-2a.8 (1994). On the other hand, in order to facilitate coordination between 
Head Start programs and substance abuse treatment providers, information about parents' 
drug and alcohol abuse must be shared with teachers, parent liaisons, referral sources, and 
the like. Indeed, the central goal of the Substance Abuse Initiative was to foster the kind of 
collaborative family counseling that can only take place when confidential information is 
made available to a relatively wide array of persons. For a summary of the students' resolu-
tion of this tension, see Patricia Barker et al., Confidentiality of Substance Abuse Informa-
tion: A Training Manual for Baltimore City Head Start (1992) (on file with author). 
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structures have failed to address the needs of these communities. 
The application of the confidentiality laws and regulations to the 
substance-abuse-related activities of Head Start exemplifies the 
shortcomings of the current legal system. Too often the interests of 
historically subordinated groups have been ill-served by traditional 
institutional structures and correspondingly traditional forms of 
legal analysis. Thus, it is appropriate to employ a different form of 
methodology, both to illuminate the situated and partial nature of 
legal prescriptions generally and to provide one example of how the 
use of an alternative jurisprudence may hold the potential for mak-
ing the law more responsive to women, children, the poor, and peo-
ple of color. 
Part I of this article sets out the statutory and regulatory scheme 
that governs the confidentiality accorded to drug and alcohol abuse 
treatment information. Accompanying that discussion is an exami-
nation of the societal interests generally thought to be served by 
these laws, as well as an exploration of their applicability to Head 
Start centers engaged in the kind of coordinated efforts envisioned 
by the Target Cities program. Part II provides more information 
about Head Start itself and includes an abbreviated political and 
social history focusing on a tradition of parental involvement in 
staffing and governance. An appreciation of this counterethic of 
client participation and governance is essential to an understanding 
of what makes Head Start distinctive. Elaboration of this local cul-
ture and organizational style will clarify the clash between legal reg-
ulation governing confidentiality and the everyday practice of Head 
Start. 
Part ID, in tum, provides a series of alternative lenses through 
which to analyze the questions of confidentiality Head Start's 
efforts to provide substance abuse-related services raises. These al-
ternative accounts reveal the partial perspective embedded within 
the relevant confidentiality statutes and regulations and suggest 
other perspectives that policymakers, administrators, and others 
might adopt. Each alternative lens draws upon a literature that has, 
in some fashion, offered a critique of traditional forms of law. The 
first lens draws on a body of work that includes a critique of the 
individualistic, rights-based approach of liberal legalism. The sec-
ond lens utilizes feminist scholarship that puts forward both an al-
ternative jurisprudential methodology and an alternative account of 
social relationships. The third and final lens comes from the work 
of a group of scholars of color who offer a vision of law centered 
upon experiences of exclusion and subordination. 
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I. THE DOCTRINAL LANDSCAPE: CONFIDENTIALITY OF DRUG 
AND ALCOHOL ABUSE TREATMENT INFORMATION 
A. The Federal Statutes and Regulations 
In the early 1970s, Congress passed two statutes designed to en-
sure the strict confidentiality of information about persons seeking 
or receiving treatment for drug or alcohol abuse.14 Pursuant to this 
Congressional mandate, in 1975 the Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare promulgated regulations intended to clarify the 
obligations of treatment programs with respect to patient confiden-
tiality and to operationalize the general statutory prohibition 
against disclosure.ts In 1987, the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare's successor, the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS), issued a revised set of confidentiality regulations 
that currently apply to all federally assisted substance-abuse treat-
ment programs.16 
The authors of the original federal regulations specified two pol-
icy objectives of the general prohibition against disclosure; both the 
enabling legislation and the regulations articulate these objectives. 
The first is a concept long associated with the testimonial privileges 
attaching to doctor-patient, lawyer-client, and priest-penitent rela-
tionships: the notion that protecting an individual's privacy will en-
courage openness and trust.17 The drafters of the federal 
regulations also identified a more unusual objective animating the 
law in this area: the idea was that if all treatment providers adhered 
to a comprehensive and rigorous confidentiality scheme, it would 
14. The provision relating to the confidentiality of drug treatment infonnation was ini· 
tially passed as § 408 of the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92· 
255, 86 Stat. 65, 79 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 1175 (1982)). That section was trans· 
ferred and amended by Pub. L. 98-24 to § 527 of the Public Health Service Act, codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 290ee-3 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). A similar process led to the codification of an 
identical provision relating to the confidentiality of alcohol abuse treatment infonnation at 
42 U.S.C. § 290 dd-3 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Both statutes were amended in 1986 to allow 
treatment providers to comply, at least in part, with state law obligations to report child 
abuse and neglect. Children's Justice and Assistance Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-401, § 106, 
100 Stat. 906 (1986) (amending sections 523(e) and 527(e) of the Public Health Service Act, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 290dd-3(e), 290ee-3(e)). In 1992, Congress consolidated the two confidentiality 
statutes into a single provision governing both alcohol and drug abuse treatment records. 42 
U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (Supp. IV 1992). As this consolidation did not involve any substantive 
changes, the implementing regulations were not revised. 
15. Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Confidential· 
ity of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Patient Records, 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.1 to 2.67-1 (1975). 
16. Public Health Services, Department of Health and Human Services, Confidentiality 
of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Patient Records, 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.1 to 2.67 (1987). 
17. 42 C.F.R. § 2.4 (1975). On testimonial privileges generally, see Rignal W. Baldwin, 
Confidentiality Between Physician and Patient, 22 Mo. L. REV. 181 (1962); Fred L. Kuhlmann, 
Communications to Clergymen - When Are They Privileged?, 2 VAL. U. L. REv. 265 (1968). 
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help to create a perception "on the street" that it is safe to seek 
treatment for the highly stigmatized conditions of alcoholism and 
drug addiction.18 
In keeping with these strongly articulated policy objectives, the 
federal confidentiality laws and regulations operate around a gen-
eral prohibition against disclosure.19 Unless one of a limited 
number of exceptions applies, the general rule is ·that a federally 
assisted drug or alcohol treatment program may not disclose any 
information that would identify a person as a patient who has 
sought or received substance abuse treatment. 
The broad definitions of key terms convey just how expansive 
the prohibition on disclosure is. The regulations define a "pro-
gram" as "a person which, in whole or in part, holds itself out as 
providing, and provides, alcohol or drug abuse diagnosis, treatment, 
or referral for treatment."20 Further, the regulations define a "dis-
closure" as a "communication of patient identifying information," 
whether it is oral or in writing, and even if the recipient already has 
the information conveyed.21 Strikingly, the term "patient" includes 
any person who has applied for or received an interview, counsel-
ing, or any other related service by a treatment program, even if the 
18. 42 C.F.R. § 2.4 (1975). Attention to both of these goals is necessary in order to ap-
preciate how the confidentiality regulations operate. Unlike analogous common law or statu-
tory privileges present in most states that focus upon disclosures in the course of litigation or 
other formill proceedings, see, e.g., MD. CoURTS AND Juo. PRoc. § 9-109{b) {1975), the fed-
eral restrictions apply to the communication of information about substance-abuse patients 
in virtually any setting. See 42 C.F.R. § 2.11 (1987) {defining "disclosure"). Moreover, the 
protections the federal laws and regulations afford are neither held simply by the patient nor 
limited to her direct control. Instead, because of the overarching goal of promoting a system-
wide adherence to strict confidentiality, the regulations generally regard the treatment pro-
gram as a rights holder presenting interests of equal moment to those of the individual pa-
tient. 42 C.F.R. § 2.33 (1987). Significantly, in subpart E of the regulations, which governs 
court orders for the disclosure of drug or alcohol abuse treatment information, a judge is 
required to make a finding of "good cause" before she is empowered to issue an order. In 
determining whether "good cause" exists, the judge is directed to give weight to the interests 
of the "treatment system" in maintaining patient confidentiality. 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.61-.67 
{1987). 
19. 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.12, 2.13(a) {1994). 
20. 42 C.F.R. § 2.11 (1987). The 1987 amendments to the regulations changed this defini-
tion to make clear that an entity will not be considered a "program" unless it "holds itself 
out" as providing substance abuse-related services. 42 C.F.R. § 2.11 (1987). In addition, the 
amended regulations added a special provision that limits their application to specialized 
personnel within a general hospital or community mental health center. 42 C.F.R. § 2.11 
{1987). 
A program is "federally assisted" within the meaning of the federal laws and regulations 
if it receives federal funds in any form, has a grant of tax-exempt status from the Internal 
Revenue Service, is licensed by the federal government, or is conducted directly by the fed-
eral government. 42 C.F.R § 2.12 (1994). 
21. 42 C.F.R. § 2.11 (1994). 
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individual has never been admitted for treatment and even if the 
program deemed that she was not in need of such services.22 
The regulations do provide a limited number of exceptions to 
the general rule to assist treatment program personnel faced with 
the choice to disclose or withhold information. Several of these ex-
ceptions emerge from the basic definitions set out above. In order 
for a communication of information to be a "disclosure" and there-
fore subject to the federal prohibition, it must identify a person as a 
"patient." Thus, a communication that is anonymous in the sense 
that it does not contain the patient's name, address, social security 
number, or likeness; that does not link an individual to drug or alco-
hol abuse treatment, which may be possible when the program 
speaks through an "umbrella" agency such as a general hospital, 
county public health department, or other multiple service pro-
vider; or that appears in the form of aggregate data is not 
prohibited.23 
Similarly, a communication of information, even if it identifies a 
patient, is not a prohibited disclosure if it occurs within a "pro-
gram" in which the recipient has a need for the information in con-
nection with her provision of treatment services to the patient.24 
Other exceptions exist for patient-identifying disclosures in cases of 
"medical emergency,"25 when a crime has been threatened or com-
mitted against program staff or on program premises,26 when a staff 
22. 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.11, 2.15(b) (1994). The following hypothetical illustrates the breadth 
of these provisions, when taken together. Assume a school-based prevention program of the 
kind that is becoming increasingly common in many communities. Clearly, when a substance 
abuse counselor addresses a group of junior high school students at an assembly, the students 
are not "patients" whose identity or participation is subject to the general prohibition against 
disclosure. If one of the children were to approach the counselor after the group meeting 
and discuss her or his use of alcohol or request information about available treatment re-
sources, however, that student would be a "patient" whose confidentiality would be pro-
tected by the federal laws and regulations. The key factor here is that once an individualized 
interaction has taken place in which a staff member of a "program" has engaged in counsel-
ing, diagnosis, or referral activities, the law applies. This is true even if the counselor in the 
hypothetical concludes that the student does not have a problem and is not in need of any 
services, because that conclusion would be deemed by the regulations to be a diagnosis or 
assessment which falls within the broad definition of "treatment." 42 C.F.R. § 2.11 (1994). 
23. 42 C.F.R. § 2.11 (1994). 
24. 42 C.F.R. § 2.12(c)(3) (1994). In addition, the regulations allow treatment programs 
to communicate with an outside entity providing needed services if the outside entity enters 
into a "qualified service organization" agreement in which it agrees to treat any patient-
identifying information it receives with full confidentiality. Essentially, this sort of an agree-
ment brings the outside service provider into the program, thus converting the disclosure into 
an internal communication. 42 C.F.R. § 2.11 (1994). 
25. 42 C.F.R. § 2.51 (1994). This exception is limited to extremely serious circumstances, 
and only "medical personnel" may receive patient-identifying information. 
26. 42 C.F.R. § 2.12(c) (1994). In these cases, only "law enforcement personnel" may be 
contacted. 
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member of the program suspects that a patient is engaged in child 
abuse or neglect,27 or when a court has issued a proper court 
order.28 
The most common exception applies to cases in which the pa-
tient has given her consent to a disclosure. The consent provisions 
of the federal regulations29 differ from state rules regarding waiver 
of testimonial privileges in that a patient's consent to disclosure of 
drug or alcohol abuse information empowers, but does not compel, 
such a communication by a treatment program.30 Additionally, the 
federal regulations' treatment of patient consent differs from other 
more familiar waiver provisions, such as consent for the release of 
general medical records, in their administrative complexity and in-
herently parsimonious approach to the sharing of information. In 
order for consent to be effective, it must be given in writing and 
must meet an extensive list of criteria. Not only must the written 
permission contain the name of the patient, the treatment program, 
and the recipient of information, it must also contain a statement of 
the purpose for the proposed disclosure, a description of the precise 
information to be communicated, an identification of the "date, 
event, or condition upon which the consent will expire," and a 
statement that the consent is subject to revocation by the patient at 
any time unless the program has already acted in reliance on it.31 
Finally, with every disclosure made by a substance-abuse treatment 
program pursuant to a patient's consent, the regulations require 
that a written notice prohibiting redisclosure be forwarded to the 
recipient of the information.32 
27. 42 C.F.R. § 2.12(c) {1994). 
28. 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.61-.67 {1994). Before an order may issue, the court must give notice to 
the patient and the treatment program, must follow elaborate procedures, must find "good 
cause" for the information to be disclosed, and must limit the disclosure accordingly. 42 
C.F.R. §§ 2.61-.67 {1994). These procedural and substantive requirements mean that this sort 
of an order is quite different, and more difficult to obtain, than other, more familiar, compul-
sory processes such as warrants and subpoenas. 
29. 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.31-.35 (1994). 
30. The only significant exception is when the patient's consent is accompanied by some 
other compulsory process, such as a judicial subpoena. In these cases, the consent removes 
any federal law prohibition against disclosure, and the state-law instrument provides the 
compulsion. 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.33, 2.61 {1994). 
31. 42 C.F.R. § 2.31 (1994). 
32. A sample notice is provided in § 2.32 of the 1994 edition of the Code of Federal Regu-
lations. This provision is extremely important because it extends the requirements of the 
federal confidentiality law to every person or organization that receives confidential informa-
tion, thereby prohibiting that recipient from engaging in any redisclosure. See 42 C.F.R. 
§ 2.32 (1994). 
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Of all the requirements for a disclosure pursuant to patient con-
sent, perhaps the most critical is the mandated purpose statement.33 
Treatment programs must designate the purpose of the disclosure 
before determining the scope of the communication, the recipient 
of the information, and the duration of the patient's consent. The 
logic here is that consent is a narrow exception to the general prohi-
bition against sharing patient-identifying information, and an initial 
identification of purpose allows the patient and program to tailor 
consent to meet that purpose in the most conservative fashion 
possible. 34 
B. Application of the Law to Head Start 
When applied to Head Start centers engaged in substance abuse 
"treatment" or "prevention," the federal confidentiality laws and 
regulations may become nearly unworkable. To understand why 
this is so, it is important to note that this entire scheme of legal 
regulation relies upon a fundamental distinction between "treat-
ment programs" and "patients." Indeed, neither the federal stat-
utes nor their implementing regulations contain any restrictions 
applicable to the sharing of information about a patient by other 
patients; the prohibition against disclosures of patient-identifying 
information applies only to a treatment program and its staff.35 
In the context of Head Start, both the concept of "program" and 
of "patient" are highly problematic. With respect to the definition 
of "program," two distinct problems may be present. The first is 
that, by tradition and design, the boundaries between staff and par-
ents within individual Head Start centers often are blurred. The 
second problem is that, even among Head Start staff who are not 
parents, it often becomes difficult to distinguish between personnel 
engaged in substance-abuse treatment and prevention functions 
from those engaged in more traditional Head Start functions. Both 
of these contested boundaries are important because they make it 
difficult to determine not only who is entitled to receive inf orma-
33. 42 C.F.R. § 2.3l{a){4) {1994). 
34. Thus, if a methadone maintenance program wishes to obtain a patient's consent in 
order to disclose information to that patient's dentist for the purpose of determining an ap-
propriate anesthetic during dental surgery, it should limit the kinds of information disclosed, 
for example, methadone dosage levels, but not counseling notes; the duration of consent, for 
example, expiration upon completion of the surgery; and even the recipient, for example, the 
dentist, but not her office staff, in a fashion that is consistent with the underlying purpose. 
35. In my work over the past few years providing legal assistance to substance abuse 
treatment programs, I have found that patients frequently do come into contact with one 
another at treatment programs, and do occasionally share information with outsiders to the 
detriment of others in treatment. 
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tion pursuant to the regulations' internal communication exception, 
but also to determine who will be bound under the federal laws not 
to redisclose patient-identifying material. 
Some examples may help to clarify these points. As part of the 
Target Cities demonstration project in Baltimore, a number of indi-
vidual Head Start centers hired an "on-site coordinator," responsi-
ble for managing a range of substance-abuse-related services 
directed to identified families.36 Clearly, these functions fall within 
the parameters of the confidentiality regulations, thereby raising 
the legal obligations described earlier. In addition, the demonstra-
tion project proposal also called for a series of "consensus building 
workshops" to be held at each center that would include all staff.37 
The long-term goal of these workshops was to provide training to 
all Head Start personnel in drug- and alcohol-abuse issues, on the 
theory that everyone from teachers to parent liaisons to clerical 
staff to kitchen workers might well become involved, if they were 
not already, in the provision of "treatment" and "prevention" 
services.38 
Given this broad-based involvement of staff and parents in 
treatment and prevention services, questions arise as to the scope 
and coverage of the federal confidentiality regulations. Suppose, 
for example, that a parent, knowing that all Head Start staff have 
received training on substance-abuse issues, bypasses the on-site co-
ordinator and instead approaches a teacher's aide to discuss her al-
cohol abuse.39 Regardless of whether the teacher's aide simply 
listens empathetically or provides "services" in the form of referral 
information, counseling, or the like, a question is raised as to 
whether she is within "the program" governed by the confidential-
ity laws and regulations. The answer to this question is crucial be-
cause it determines the circumstances under which the teacher's 
aide will be able to share this information with other people inside 
or outside of the Head Start center who might be able to provide 
36. Baltimore Urban Services Agency, Collaboration, supra note 5, at app. B. 
37. Baltimore Urban Services Agency, Building the Capacity, supra note 5, at 11 (at-
tempting "to prioritize the substance abuse related needs of the program and to develop 
plans for addressing these needs"). 
38. Significantly, the project description makes clear that these efforts are also designed 
to address alcohol and drug abuse among Head Start personnel. Here again, the line be-
tween service provider and service recipient is not terribly clear. Id. 
39. Such a scenario is neither unlikely nor uncommon. In working with Baltimore-area 
Head Start centers, my students and I discovered that parents not uncommonly seek out 
those workers with whom they have the most daily contact, and hence trust, in order to 
obtain support or assistance for extremely serious and sensitive family problems. See Barker 
et al., supra note 13, at 24-25 (discussing the legal ramifications of such a scenario). 
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assistance. Desired contacts might include other teachers at the 
Head Start center who might know whether the classroom behavior 
and performance of the parent's child indicates a possible substance 
abuse problem within the family,40 or personnel at nearby treat-
ment programs who might be in a position to work directly with the 
parent. The designation of the teacher's aide as either within or 
outside of "the program" would determine the steps the aide or 
another staff member would have to take, including obtaining the 
parent's written consent, in order to make such disclosures. 
These kinds of interpretive problems arise in this context be-
cause Head Start centers, unlike more conventional social service 
settings, tend not to be rigidly organized into units or departments, 
and tend not to have unyielding role-specific job descriptions. Most 
Head Start staff members perform a much broader array of over-
lapping functions than is typical at other social service agencies.41 
Thus, though it is clear that the federal confidentiality restrictions 
apply in some fashion to a Head Start center engaged in the kinds 
of activities envisioned by the Target Cities initiative, because the 
center "hold[ s] itself out to the community as providing diagnosis, 
treatment, or referral for treatment for alcohol and/or drug abuse," 
as the regulations require,42 it is considerably less clear whether 
these restrictions should apply only to certain designated personnel 
or to all staff members without regard to title or payroll status.43 
40. For a good discussion of the kinds of observations that might lead a classroom teacher 
to conclude that a child has been exposed to substance abusing adults, see CoLUNs & AN-
DERSON, supra note 2, at 23-24. 
41. See Barker et al., supra note 13. 
42. THE LEGAL AcnoN CENTER OF THE CrrY OF NEw YoRK, INc., CoNFIDENTIAUTY: 
A GUIDE To THE NEw FEDERAL REGl!LATIONS 73-74 (1988). 
43. Unlike the hypothetical conversation in text, a conversation between an alcoholic 
patient and a nurse's aide in a general hospital would not be sufficient to bring the federal 
confidentiality regulations into play, unless the nurse's aide were assigned to a specialized 
substance abuse treatment unit or otherwise had as her or his "primary function" the treat-
ment of drug or alcohol abuse. 42 C.F.R. § 2.11 (1994), which sets out these rules relating to 
the definition of "the program" in a general medical care facility, is subject to two plausible 
interpretations. Under the first, the requirement of staff specialization can be understood to 
apply to any institution, such as a community mental health center or school, that performs 
substance abuse treatment or prevention functions. Under this interpretation, the lack of 
departmentalization or specialization within individual Head Start centers makes the ques-
tion of the applicability of the confidentiality regulations especially difficult to resolve. The 
second interpretation, which eases Head Start's legal problem somewhat, is that the regula-
tions' limitation to identified units is meant to apply only to general medical hospitals. If this 
interpretation were to prevail, it would be easier to argue that the confidentiality regulations 
apply to all Head Start personnel, because all staff members would be considered to be 
within "the program." There is some support for this second interpretation in the history of 
the revised 1987 regulations. Under the former regulations, no limitations based upon spe-
cialization or departmentalization had been present, and the confidentiality protections cov-
ered alcohol or drug abuse treatment records without regard to the nature of the entity that 
had delivered those services. See Legal Action Center of the City of New York, Inc., supra 
August 1995] Confidentiality and Head Start 2337 
Equally difficult to manage within the context of the federal 
confidentiality laws and regulations is the tendency in many Head 
Start centers not to make rigid distinctions between parents and 
staff. As will be explained in more detail in Part IT, this lack of 
differentiation is a product, in part, of longstanding legal require-
ments that parents be involved in Head Start under the Office of 
Economic Opportunity (OEO) principle of "maximum feasible par-
ticipation. "44 This directive has come to be understood not simply 
as a requirement that parents be included as "learners" but also 
that they be utilized as teachers, support staff, and "decision mak-
ers."45 As will be discussed in Part Ill, the inclusion of parents in 
all facets of Head Start's operations can be attributed to the values, 
interactive styles, and experiences of those who have been associ-
ated with the program from its inception: principally women, and 
especially women of color.46 Together, these influences have gener-
ated an organizational model that tends to emphasize relationship-
building more than independence, cooperation more than competi-
tion, and general involvement more than hierarchical role 
di:fferentiation.47 
note 42, at 73. According to the transmittal notice issued by the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and 
Mental Health Administration of HHS that accompanied the new regulations, the additional 
requirements were meant to ease the "administrative burden" flowing from application of 
the confidentiality prohibitions to hospital emergency rooms and surgical wards. Signifi-
cantly, no mention was made of departmentalization in other institutional settings. Id. 
44. Jeanette Valentine & Evan Stark, The Social Context of Parent Involvement in Head 
Start, in PROJECT HEAD START: A LEGACY OF nm WAR ON POVERTY 291-93 (Edward 
Zigler & Jeanette Valentine eds., 1979). 
45. Id. at 295-98; see also Mmco Enuc. Assocs., PERSPECTIVES ON PARENT PARTICIPA-
TION IN PROJECT HEAD START: AN ANALYSIS AND C!unQUE I-50 to I-80 (1972). 
46. See generally Lucie E. White, Client Involvement in the Governance of Head Start 
(1990) (unpublished narrative of a grant application to the Law and Social Science Program 
of the National Science Foundation, grant #SES9022787, on file with author) [hereinafter 
White, Client Involvement]; see also White, supra note 12, at 2001-02. 
47. For a good general discussion of "organizational types" among grassroots community 
organizations, see Lucie E. White, Collaborative Lawyering in the Field? On Mapping the 
Paths from Rhetoric to Practice, 1 CLINICAL L. REv. 157, 164-66 (1994) [hereinafter White, 
Collaborative Lawyering]. Interestingly, Professor White treats Head Start as a "state-spon-
sored initiative" that is "both structured and funded by the state," and she describes some 
other organizations as organizationally less rigid. Her account of one example of this latter 
type of group, an organization for drug-involved women, is in fact a particularly apt descrip-
tion of the findings that my students and I made with respect to our Head Start clients: 
[T]hese groups .•• also tend to be less paternalistic and organizationally rigid than chari-
table initiatives. These initiatives wrestle with the traditional role definitions of "client" 
and "helping professional" because their members have experienced the distance and 
insensitivity of professionals, but at the same time recognize their own need for help. 
Id. at 165. The capacity of many Head Start centers to retain a relatively nonbureaucratic 
organizational style despite being sponsored and funded by the government is something of 
an irony. I attempt to offer some partial explanations for this below. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 144-57. 
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One fairly simple method for distinguishing staff from nonstaff 
might be to identify those who are on Head Start's payroll as staff. 
Unfortunately, such an approach would not comport with the prac-
tice of many centers to rely heavily upon unpaid volunteers and to 
grant considerable policy-making power to parents.48 In addition, 
for years Head Start has employed a large number of parents and 
has utilized a "career ladder" approach in which employees are en-
couraged to progress from volunteer to paid staff.49 Finally, in the 
context of projects like the one undertaken in Baltimore, respond-
ing to the drug and alcohol problems of staff members has been 
nearly as high a priority as the effort to assist Head Start parents 
with their substance abuse problems.so 
In light of these organizational characteristics, it would not be 
unusual for an alcoholic parent to seek referral information or 
other help from a teacher's aide who is herself a Head Start parent. 
As just noted, it is common for mothers, and sometimes fathers, of 
enrolled children to be present in Head Start classrooms as volun-
teers.51 Under this version of the hypothetical, the confidentiality 
rules might apply, given that the federal regulations make no men-
tion of any requirement that program staff be on the payroll.s2 If 
the requirements of federal confidentiality law bound the teacher's 
aide, however, she might be unable to seek assistance from others 
without first obtaining written consent, in which case the regula-
tions would transform an informal conversation between the two 
Head Start parents into a formal therapeutic relationship between a 
treatment provider and her client, with all of the attendant distanc-
ing and potential alienation that such formality implies.s3 
This example illustrates that.any effort to map the confidential-
ity rules onto the nonhierarchical milieu found within many Head 
Start centers will not be a simple matter. The federal laws' funda-
mental differentiation between service providers and service recipi-
ents was designed to encourage individuals designated as "patients" 
48. See Mmco EDUC. Assocs., supra note 45; ANN O'KEEFE, WHAT HEAD START 
MEANs TO FAMILIES 9-12 (1979); Valentine & Stark, supra note 44. 
49. See Penelope K. Trickett, Career Development in Head Start, in PROJECT HEAD 
START, supra note 44, at 315; see also O'KEEFE, supra note 48, at 9. 
50. See Baltimore Urban Services Agency, Building the capacity, supra note 5. 
51. Alternatively, the teacher's aide might be the parent of a former Head Start student 
who has now moved up the "career ladder" to occupy a paid paraprofessional position within 
the center. 
52. Indeed, the parent seeking help for her alcoholism might herself be a staff member of 
the Head Start center. 
53. See William Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE 
W. 1198, 1233-35 (1983); !ee also infra text accompanying notes 185-88. 
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to seek treatment from entities designated as "programs" by ensur-
ing that the status and identity of the former would be safeguarded 
by the latter. When applied to Head Start, this regulatory scheme is 
often inappropriate. 
The world of Head Start is comprised of people, designated as 
"parents," who are already engaged, sometimes deeply, in the col-
lective enterprises that make up Head Start. Rather than en-
courage participation in substance abuse treatment through 
confidentiality, Head Start centers may best be able to intervene in 
the lives of families suffering from substance abuse by . building 
upon the trust already developed through ongoing interactions and 
stable relationships at the center. How to balance the beneficial 
aspects of individual privacy against the clinical potential of rela-
tionships and collective engagement is no easy matter, however.54 
What is important for the purpose of this article is to recognize that 
the federal confidentiality laws and regulations have answered this 
question by uniformly insisting on protecting the privacy of individ-
ual rights holders. Part III of this article explores the possibility of 
gynerating a more relationship-based answer. 
The difficulties involved in defining a "patient" in the Head 
Start context are as great as those already encountered with respect 
to the definition of a "program." Here, questions relating to the 
meaning of statutory and regulatory language are not the primary 
obstacle. Instead, the task is how to apply relatively clear prescrip-
tions to a setting in which obvious interpretations may not create 
the most effective results. 
As previously explained, the federal confidentiality regulations 
define a "patient" as an "individual" who has applied for or re-
ceived diagnosis, counseling, or referral services from a drug or al-
cohol abuse treatment program.55 Given this language, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the drafters intended to protect the pri-
vacy interests of individuals suffering from substance abuse. A fun-
damental tenet of Head Start, however, is that services should be 
directed not to individuals but to "families."56 
54. This question has long vexed "therapeutic communities," which are residential drug 
and alcohol treatment programs in which clients spend as long as 18 months in treatment. 
'fypically, toward the end of their stay, usually during their last six months, clients begin to 
perform staff functions. The clear distinctions drawn between patients and staff in the federal 
confidentiality regulations have never fit well in this clinical setting. See generally William B. 
O'Brien & D. Vmcent Biase, Therapeutic Community (TC): A Coming of Age, in SUB-
STANCE ABusE: A CoMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK 446 (Joyce H. Lowinson et al. eds., 2d ed. 
1992). 
55. See supra text accompanying note 22. 
56. See O'KEEFE, supra note 48, at 3. 
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As early as 1965, initial Head Start planners began developing a 
philosophy that viewed children "within the context of the family 
and community."57 By 1975, the Performance Standards for Head 
Start Programs had made clear that "[t]he child's entire family, as 
well as the community must be involved."58 These principles have 
long guided the development of policy in local Head Start agencies, 
and have led to important programmatic innovations like the Child 
and Family Resource Program (CFRP), which was launched in 
eleven cities in the early 1970's as a "family-focused demonstration 
project."59 Indeed, building upon the family-centered approach 
characteristic of Head Start's enterprise, and recognizing the com-
plex family dynamics associated with drug addiction and alcohol-
ism,60 the Baltimore Target Cities project and others like it have 
identified the need to direct substance-abuse-related services to the 
whole family unit as a central feature of their efforts. 61 
Once again, the Head Start approach is at odds with the struc-
ture of the confidentiality law. A particularly good illustration of 
the federal regulations' individualistic perspective involves the rules 
governing minors who have sought or received treatment. In some 
states, minors may enroll in drug or alcohol treatment without the 
consent of their parents.62 In these states, the federal regulations 
provide that any communication of patient-identifying information 
to the minor's parent or parents will constitute a prohibited disclo-
sure unless it can be brought within one of the recognized excep-
tions, principally consent.63 In states that still require parental 
notification or approval for the treatment of a minor, the confiden-
tiality implications become somewhat more complicated. In these 
states, the federal regulations prohibit the treatment program from 
57. Id. (footnote omitted). The tenn "family" was not defined in these early documents. 
For present purposes, an appropriate definition might regard a family as "any child-rearing 
structure." 
58. Id. at 4. 
59. Id. at 34. Significantly, the "unit of enrollment" in CFRP was the family, rather than 
the individual child, and the goal was to promote the "healthy development of the young 
children in the family from the prenatal stage through the third grade." Id. at 35. In many 
ways, the current Target Cities initiative can be understood as a successor to this early 
program. 
60. See generally EILEEN M. CoRRIGAN, ALCOHOUC WOMEN IN TREATMENT 86-130 
(1980); George Wmokur & Paula Clayton, Family History Studies: Comparison of Male and 
Female Alcoholics, 29 Q.J. STUD. ALCOHOL 885 (1968). 
61. This central feature is evidenced by the plan to hire on-site coordinators to manage 
the family's substance abuse problems in a "holistic" fashion. See Baltimore Urban Services 
Agency, Building the Capacity, supra note 5, at 2-3. 
62. See, e.g., Mn. CoDE ANN., HEALnI·GEN., § 20-102(c)(l) (1990). 
63. 42 C.F.R. § 2.14(b) (1994). 
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communicating with the parents in order to obtain their approval 
unless the minor, whose involvement in treatment may be as mini-
mal as an initial phone inquiry, :first consents to the "disclosure" of 
her or his "patient" status.64 
This highly individualistic definition of "the patient" takes on a 
special meaning when it is applied to the regulations' internal pro-
gram communication exception to the general prohibition against 
disclosures. The regulations allow for the communication of infor-
mation "between or among personnel having a need for the infor-
mation in connection with their duties that arise out of the 
provision of diagnosis, treatment, or referral for treatment" of the 
patient.65 In most therapeutic settings, this provision is relied upon 
with some regularity, and it is simple to apply.66 In the Head Start 
setting, on the other hand, this provision excludes a whole range 
of communications essential to its holistic approach to treating 
families. 
For example, if the internal communications exception is limited 
to information necessary to help treat a parent's abuse of drugs or 
alcohol, then the regulations force a teacher who wishes to share 
information about the parent's substance abuse in order to facilitate 
the delivery of services to that parent's child to obtain separate con-
sent from the parent. While this requirement is not on its face un-
reasonable, it could severely inhibit ongoing collaborative efforts 
between teacher and parent, particularly if the need for individual, 
written consent were to arise several times each day. 
An alternative construction of the term "patient" that reflected 
the Head Start philosophy might include not only the parent, but 
her or his children, or even the entire family in some cases. This 
construction would be at odds with the plain meaning of the regula-
tory language and basic assumptions implicit in the confidentiality 
laws. Nevertheless, the potentially close connections between a 
parent's abuse of drugs or alcohol and her or his child's behavior or 
progress in the classroom, and the equally close links between the 
development of the child and her or his parent's substance abuse, 
could be exploited for the benefit of the whole family unit, if an 
expanded definition of the term "patient" could be employed. 
To be sure, this sort of expansion of the term "patient," with its 
attendant diminution of individual privacy within a Head Start 
64. 42 C.F.R. § 2.14(c) (1994). 
65. 42 C.F.R. § 2.12{c){3) {1994). 
66. See LEGAL AcnoN CENTER OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, INC., supra note 42, at 20. 
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center, carries real dangers of abuse. Relaxing the prohibition on 
disclosing information about a parent's drug or alcohol problems 
might disincline some individuals from confiding in counselors or 
otherwise seeking help.67 This relationship between legal rights and 
individual decisionmaking is at the heart of the federal confidential-
ity laws and regulations.68 The system of services being developed 
within Head Start, however, presumes a very different approach 
founded upon trust and connection. Determining whether this al-
ternative approach to structuring relationships between providers 
and recipients of services is better or worse than the one promul-
gated in the federal regulations is difficult. What is not difficult to 
discern is the gap between the perspective endorsed by the law and 
the behavior embodied in the actual operation of Head Start pro-
grams throughout the country. 
II. HEAD START: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ALTERNATIVE 
PoLmCAL CuLTUREs 
Since its inception in the mid-1960s, Head Start centers through-
out the United States have provided education, health, and other 
social services to over 11 million children and their families.69 Cur-
rently, more than 700,000 children between the ages of three and 
five are enrolled in Head Start.70 Recent studies report that over 90 
percent of all Head Start families live below the poverty line, and 
more than half are headed by a single parent.71 Roughly three-
quarters of all participants in Head Start are people of color.72 
Significantly, in the current age of skepticism about government 
initiatives, Head Start has generally received praise and support: In 
the past several years, leading Democrats in the House and Senate 
have sponsored legislation to expand greatly federal funding for 
Head Start, in order to insure a place for every income-eligible 
child between the ages of three and five.73 A number of Republi-
67. Cf. White, Collaborative Lawyering, supra note 47, at 167 (describing the negative 
reactions of poor women to intrusive community group practices that fail to respect clients' 
privacy or autonomy). 
68. See LEGAL ACTION CENraR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, INC., supra note 42, at 2. 
69. REPORT OF THE SILVER RmBON PANEL, NATIONAL HEAD START ASSOCIATION, 
HEAD START: THE NATioN's PRIDE, A NATION'S CHALLENGE 1 (1990) [hereinafter REPORT 
OF THE SILVER RmBON PANEL). 
70. Barbara Vobejda, Head Start Expansion is Urged, WASH. Posr, Jan. 13, 1994, at 4. 
71. REPORT OF THE SILVER RmBON p ANEL, supra note 69, at 1. 
72. See id. at 2. 
73. This would amount to some 2.5 million children. On May 18, 1994, President Clinton 
signed into law a bill authorizing a significant expansion of the Head Start program. The 
House vote in favor of the bill was 393 to 20, while the Senate vote was 98 to 2. Vice Presi· 
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cans, including former President Bush, have also expressed strong 
support,74 although the current Republican leadership is seeking re-
ductions in Head Start's funding. Business leaders have joined the 
chorus of supporters,75 and new strategies have been proposed to 
strengthen ties between Head Start and the business community.16 
Recent public opinion polling has indicated that a majority of 
Americans believe Head Start should be expanded.77 
The story of Head Start's genesis and development over the 
years has been told and retold by numerous writers.78 Some ac-
counts depict a program design based upon the theoretical work of 
child development experts, physicians, and educators who saw 
Head Start as an opportunity to interrupt a "cycle of poverty" by 
helping poor children overcome "cultural deprivation."79 Other 
histories stress the importance of Head Start's roots in the commu-
nity action movement of the late 1950s and 60s. so These accounts 
argue for the central importance of the parental involvement com-
ponent of the program, and suggest that, from the beginning, Head 
dent Gore called final passage of the bill a "love fest" The legislation included a $595 mil-
lion increase in funding, and plans to expand the program to children under the age of three. 
It also called for the development of some full-day, year-round classes. See Helen Dewar & 
Barbara Vobejda, Clinton Signs Head Start Expansion, WASH. Posr, May 19, 1994, at Al, 
A6; see also Ronald Henkoff, Now Everyone Loves Head Start, 121 FORTUNE MAG., Spring, 
1990, at 35. In July of 1995, however, a House Appropriations subcommittee voted to cut a 
number of education programs for the poor. The plan would reduce Head Start's budget 
somewhat. See Tiiting Against the Poor, N.Y. TlMEs, July 13, 1995, at A22. 
It is worth noting that the Head Start program has recently come in for criticism as well 
Several reviews by the Inspector General have identified problems with physical facilities 
and lax paperwork, and other studies have noted that low pay scales have made it difficult to 
attract and retain effective teachers. In response to these reports, Health and Human Serv-
ices Secretary Donna E. Shalala appointed a 48-member Advisory Committee on Head Start 
Quality and Expansion. In January of 1994, the Advisory Panel issued a report recom-
mending enhanced teacher training, upgraded salaries, and greater professionalism in the 
management of the program. See Vobejda, supra note 70. Although many of these recom-
mendations are sound, the report does raise the concern that an increased "professionaliza-
tion" of Head Start will undermine the distinct local culture that has, in part, made this 
program so effective. See infra Part III. 
74. George Bush, The State of the Union, quoted in WASH. Posr, Feb. 1, 1990, at AS. 
Nevertheless, the most recent Republican budget proposals call for cutting Head Start by 
$210 million below 1995 funding levels. This would result in a reduction of 180,000 children 
by the year 2002. Rene Sanchez & John F. Harris, Direction, Not Dollars, Drives Debate over 
Education, \V ASH. Posr, June 22, 1995, at A29. 
75. Henkoff, supra note 73. 
76. REPORT OF THE SILVER RIBBON PANEL, supra note 69, at 46. 
77. See id. at 4. 
78. See generally PROJECT HEAD START, supra note 44. 
79. Most of those who served on an initial planning committee convened in January of 
1965 by OEO Director Sargent Shriver meet this description. Edward Zigler & Jeanette 
Valentine, Head Start, A Retrospective Vzew: The Founders, in PRoracr HEAD START, supra 
note 44, at 72. 
80. See Mmco Enuc. Assocs., supra note 45, at I-12 to I-18. 
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Start had the potential to help organize and empower poor commu-
nities.Bl Still other histories tell a story that focuses on domestic 
political controversies surrounding the Johnson Administration's 
war on poverty, the civil rights movement, and simple.political ex-
pediency.82 More recently, scholarly work has examined the local 
culture within many Head Start centers as an example of how sus-
tained interactions between groups of subordinated people and a 
welfare bureaucracy can lead to creative, new social structures.B3 
Each of these accounts captures at least a part of the story. Per-
haps what is most important about Head Start, its tradition of pa-
rental involvement, and its current status as a social service 
enterprise that "works,"84 however, is how these histories have op-
erated together over time. It is worth constructing a short compos-
ite account of these histories in order to make possible the analysis 
Part III of this article sets forth. 
From the beginning there has been a strain of thought surround-
ing the Head Start project that can best be described within the 
terms of conventional liberalism.BS This perspective, which views 
poverty and racism as unfortunate abnormalities within the larger 
culture, urges the application of special remedial resources deliv-
ered through a welfare bureaucracy as the best means for eradicat-
ing - or in the language of the 1960s, "curing" - these 
problems.B6 At the same time, and throughout its existence, an al-
ternative perspective has also energized the activities of some Head 
Start participants. According to this perspective, the range of 
problems associated with poverty are not solely the result of inade-
quate resources, but are due in large measure to the diminished 
political power of subordinated communities.87 Not surprisingly, 
advocates of this approach, though concerned about the delivery of 
services to poor clients, were far more interested in organizing com-
81. These accounts build upon the early influence of community organizers, including 
Saul Alinsky, and community organizations such as Mobilization For Youth. See infra notes 
102-11 and accompanying text. 
82. See Edward Zigler & Karen Anderson, An Idea Whose Time Had Come: The Intel-
lectual and Political Climate, in PROJECT HEAD START, supra note 44, at 12-16. 
83. White, Client Involvement, supra note 46; White, Collaborative Lawyering, supra 
note 47. 
84. See Everybody Likes Head Start, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 20, 1989, at 49. 
85. For a helpful discussion of the basic elements of liberalism, see Howard Lesnick, The 
Wellsprings of Legal Responses to Inequality: A Perspective On Perspectives, 1991 DuKE LJ. 
413, 426-31. See also infra section III.B. 
86. Lesnick, supra note 85; see also Sargent Shriver, The Origins of Head Start, in PRO-
JECT HEAD START, supra note 44, at 49. 
87. See, e.g., RICHARD A. CLOWARD & LLOYD E. OHLIN, DELINQUENCY AND 0PPORTU· 
NITY: A THEORY OF DELINQUENT GANGS (1960). 
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munity groups and working toward their empowerment and polit-
ical self-sufficiency.ss This perspective - more difficult to 
characterize politically -· received little official sanction in the orig-
inal descriptions of the project.89 Nevertheless, it held sway with 
some planners within OEO's Community Action Program (CAP), 
and may have been responsible for the statutory injunction to seek 
the "maximum feasible participation" of community members in 
OEO programs such as legal aid, VISTA, and the like.9o 
The history of Head Start, then, is a history of struggle between 
a then-prevailing liberal perspective and a more diffuse and poten-
tially more radical perspective, both at the policymaking level and 
in the field.91 While both perspectives have been present within the 
program for more than twenty-five years, there has been a gradual 
- though uneven - strengthening of the latter approach, at least 
with regard to issues surrounding parent involvement in Head Start. 
In some respects, the most telling feature of this history has 
been the persistent tendency of government policy and legal regula-
tion to lag one step behind the day-to-day reality of family and 
community involvement in Head ·start that appears to have arisen 
"spontaneously."92 Whether this pattern has operated to legitimate 
and rationalize the successes in self-governance and community or-
ganization Head Start families accomplished, as some have sug-
gested, or to restrain the energy of that grassroots movement, as 
88. Save for its placement within OEO's Community Action Program (CAP), little or no 
mention was made of parental control or community organizing within the original docu-
ments which began Project Head Start, and even the decision to work within CAP was proba-
bly the result primarily of the Johnson Administration's desire to minimize political criticism 
directed at CAP by including a program for children, always an especially favored group 
within the political culture. See Mmco Eouc. Assocs., supra note 45, at 1-54 to 1-55. De-
spite this initial ascendancy of the liberal perspective among Head Start's planners, a grass-
roots political activism on the part of Head Start parents has also been present from the 
beginning. See Valentine & Stark, supra note 44, at 304-07. 
89. See, e.g., Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks On Project Head Start, (May 18, 1965), in 
PRomcr HEAD START, supra note 44, at 67-69. 
90. There has been considerable controversy regarding the origins of this phrase, as well 
as the intention of its authors. Although there is virtually no legislative history available to 
assist in answering these questions, see Mmco Eouc. Assocs., supra note 45, at 1-40 to 1-45, 
some writers have argued that it was intended to protect African Americans in the southern 
states, see, e.g., DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, MAx!MUM FEAsmLE MISUNDERSTANDING 86 {1969), 
while others have claimed that it was meant to make welfare programs more accountable to 
those intended to be served, see, e.g., Sanford J. Kravitz, Community Action Program - Past, 
Present, and Its Future, in ON FIGHTING POVERTY: PERSPECTIVES FROM EXPERIENCE 68 
(James L. Sundquist ed., 1969). 
91. The terms "liberal" and "radical" are being used in a qualified manner, as an attempt 
to capture the relative perspectives at contest in this history. These labels are meant to carry 
the meanings ascribed to them in Lesnick, supra note 85. 
92. Valentine & Stark, supra note 44, at 306. 
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others have claimed,93 is an open question. What is clear, however, 
is that this unconventional model has grown and persisted despite a 
political climate that otherwise has been explicitly hostile to such 
undertakings. 
The competition between the liberal and the radical perspec-
tives has been most visible with respect to the question of parental 
role within Head Start.94 One model of parental involvement has 
focused on the task of helping Head Start mothers, and, occasion-
ally, fathers, acquire better parenting skills. Several writers have 
labelled this perspective the "cultural-deprivation model."95 It has 
been described as follows: 
[T]he poor themselves perpetuate poverty: They share traits, habits, 
values, and aspirations that they transmit to their children in the same 
way other cultural patterns are transmitted. In this way, a "cycle of 
poverty" is established. At the same time the poor resist, fail to de-
velop, or are denied the experiences from which alone come the traits 
needed for "success." The problem, then, is a dual one: to replace 
the culture of poverty with middle-class habits and to introduce those 
experiences that the poor lack, experiences that are prerequisites for 
success.96 
A majority of Head Start's initial planning committee held some 
version of this "cultural-deprivation" perspective. Many of these 
experts had served on, or were influenced by, President Kennedy's 
Panel on Mental Retardation. This earlier panel's study of mental 
retardation indicated that "slow learn[ ers ]" in "urban and rural 
slums" lacked "motivation toward achievement," and suffered from 
"disorganized" families devoid of "middle-class values."97 In so 
finding, the panel explicitly rejected the then-current belief that 
"personality traits associated with poverty were inherited."98 In-
stead, since they credited the findings of researchers that the "intel-
lect is, to a large extent, a product of experience, not inheritance,"99 
their recommendations for breaking the "cycle of poverty" cen-
93. See id. at 308-09. 
94. See id. at 302. 
95. See generally CHARI.Es v ALENTINE, CuLTURE AND POVERTY: CrunauE ANO COUN· 
TERPROPOSALS (1968). 
96. Valentine & Stark, supra note 44, at 299; see also Mmco Eouc. Assocs., supra note 
45, at 1-2 to 1-12 (collecting authorities). 
97. Valentine & Stark, supra note 44, at 300-01; see also Mmco Eouc. Assocs., supra 
note 45, at 1-7 to 1-10; Shriver, supra note 86, at 49-54. 
98. Robert E. Cooke, Introduction to PRoracr HEAD START, supra note 44, at xxiii. 
99. Id. 
August 1995] Confidentiality and Head Start 2347 
tered upon the development of a network of preschool centers to 
be "built in connection with every low-cost housing project."100 
As reinterpreted by the early Head Start planners, these recom-
mendations of the Mental Retardation Panel led to a belief that ~ 
relatively short-term, early education program for poor children 
could provide something like an "inoculation" against the debilitat-
ing influences found in their family and community environ-
ments.101 Correlatively, if the parents could also receive training in 
more effective parenting skills, their children's inoculation might 
persist. Thus, as originally conceived, the cultural-deficit model 
clearly envisioned the involvement of parents as "learners" and as 
recipients of services, but not as equal participants in a collabora-
tive endeavor. 
At roughly the same time that the Mental Retardation Panel 
developed the cultural-deficit model, policy analysts affiliated with 
the Ford Foundation and the President's Committee on Juvenile 
Delinquency were developing a second, somewhat more radical 
model.102 This alternative model stemmed from a critique of ex-
isting welfare programs as "unresponsive" and "irrelevant" to the 
communities they were intended to serve.103 In particular, these 
analysts argued that social service workers operating in poor com-
munities had failed to understand that most of the problems con-
fronting their clients were interrelated and structural. Because 
clients had little or no participation in the design or implementation 
of programs, the professionals involved often had an unrealistic un-
derstanding of the problems they were seeking to ameliorate. As a 
consequence, the services they offered were fragmented and often 
inappropriate.104 
In an effort to respond to these criticisms of existing social ser-
vice agencies, the President's Delinquency Committee sponsored 
three demonstration projects, the most famous of which was Mobil-
ization for Youth on the lower East Side of New York.105 The de-
sign of these demonstration projects was based upon the work of 
Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin, who had argued that juvenile 
delinquency among the poor was not primarily the result of individ-
100. Valentine & Stark, supra note 44, at 300 (quoting TASK FORCE ON PREVENTION, 
1962 PREsIDENTIAL REPORT ON MENTAL RETARDATION). 
101. Johnson, supra note 89, at 67-68. 
102. See Mmco EDUC. Assocs., supra note 45, at I-12 to I-14. 
103. MOYNIHAN, supra note 90, at 69 (quoting Sanford Kravitz). 
104. See Mmco EDUC. Assocs., supra note 45, at I-12 to I-14. 
105. The other two were located in Harlem, New York and New Haven, Connecticut. See 
Valentine & Stark, supra note 44, at 301. 
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ual character flaws, a culture of poverty, or any other deficits spe-
cific to the ghetto or its inhabitants. Instead, they argued that 
delinquency among the poor was a predictable consequence of a 
larger social and political order in which opportunity was systemati-
cally denied to poor communities of color.106 
Because the emphasis within this alternative model was on the 
structural impediments to opportunity confronting young people in 
poor communities, the prescriptions offered by the Committee on 
Juvenile Delinquency and the policy papers coming out of Mobili-
zation for Youth107 rejected individually targeted social services of 
the kind urged by liberals. Instead, they urged community-based 
strategies designed to foster local leadership and community com-
petence.10s A number of OEO planners outside of the Head Start 
program109 espoused this "institutional change model," as some 
writers have called it, 110 and this model thus found its way into 
OEO's community action programming, where it immediately drew 
criticism.111 
Among those involved in the development of the first Head 
Start demonstration program, the "institutional change" or "em-
powerment" model, and its implications for parental involvement, 
held little sway.112 Had this potentially more radical perspective 
106. See CLowARD & OHLIN, supra note 87. Cloward and Ohlin's work built upon the 
theory of anomie as developed by Emile Durkheim and Robert Merton. See EMILE Duru<:-
HEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (George Simpson trans., Free Press 1964) (1893); 
ROBERT MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 121-94 (rev. ed. 1957). 
107. See, e.g., Richard A. Cloward & Irwin Epstein, Private Social Welfare's Disengage-
ment from the Poor: The Case of Family Adjustment Agencies, in COMMUNITY AcnoN 
AGAINST POVERTY: READINGS FROM THE MOBILIZATION EXPERIENCE 40 (George A. 
Brager & Francis P. Purcell eds., 1967). 
108. The idea of community competence was developed by Nelson Foote and Leonard 
Cottrell, who described it as follows: 
Competence denotes capabilities to meet and deal with a changing world, to formulate 
ends and implement them. The incessant problem of equipping human beings to handle 
their affairs and to progress towards the discovery of new values and new means is not 
solved by authoritarian indoctrination of static attributes and beliefs. 
NELSON N. FOOTE & LEONARD S. COTTRELL, JR., IDENTITY AND INTERPERSONAL CoMPE· 
TENCE 49 (1955). 
109. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 90. 
110. Valentine & Stark, supra note 44, at 301. 
111. See Shriver, supra note 86, at 59. To be sure, earlier demonstration projects like 
Mobilization for Youth and Haryou-Act, which had "openly supported street action and em-
ployed radicals," expressed a more unalloyed version of the radical perspective. OEO's 
Community Action Program, by contrast, was a much tamer amalgam of radical and liberal 
elements that sought to deliver services as well as stimulate political change. Valentine & 
Stark, supra note 44, at 302. 
112. MIDco EDUC. Assocs., supra note 45, at I-53. A few members of Head Start's ini-
tial planning committee who did object to this limited conception of parental rote took their 
concerns to Sargent Shriver. They did not prevail. See id. at I-52 to I-53; see also Valentine & 
Stark, supra note 44, at 303. 
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taken hold among the early Head Start planners, there might have 
been some recognition of the need to involve parents not simply as 
"learners,, or helpers, but also as decisionmakers. Instead, operat-
ing almost entirely within the cultural-deficit model, the planners 
conceived of a program in which parents would receive services 
along with their children but would play no other roles.113 
As a number of writers have observed,114 some features of the 
original Head Start offering were the result of the hasty manner in 
which it began. The program was originally conceived as a summer 
project for up to 25,000 children.115 Within a few months, the plan 
had become so popular politically that the first summer demonstra-
tion involved half a million children.116 In order to provide services 
on this scale, the federal program made extensive use of public 
school facilities that would otherwise be idle during the summer 
months, as well as public school teachers.117 Similarly, because 
"[t]he major concern was whether or not a high-quality program 
could be quickly and cheaply produced on a mass scale/, discussion 
of parent roles in the program focused upon their use as volunteer 
aides and helping hands.11s When coupled with the ascendancy of 
the cultural-deficit model within the planning group, it is not sur-
prising that the group gave little attention to the possibility that 
parents might play a significant role in the design, development, 
and governance of their local programs. 
This view of parents as "adjuncts to the program/,119 is clearly 
reflected in the first official guidelines for Project Head Start.120 
113. See Mroco EDuc. Assocs., supra note 45, at 1-52. This last statement should be 
clarified somewhat. The "Gooke Memo," which was the first official statement of Head Start 
policy, did set out "multiple roles" for parents. Thus, they were to function as teachers' 
aides, volunteers, and observers. Nevertheless, it was plain that early Head Start policymak-
ers did not recognize parents as significant participants in the development of local policies, 
nor were parents targeted for community organizing. It was this rather limited conception 
that Saul Alinksy, a leading proponent of the empowerment model, termed "poverty pornog-
raphy." Id. at 1-25, 1-51; Shriver, supra note 86, at 60; see also Saul D. Alinsky, The War on 
Poverty- Political Pornography, in POVERTY: PoWER AND P01.mcs 171 (Chaim Isaac Wax-
man ed., 1968). 
114. See, e.g., Mroco EDuc. Assocs., supra note 45, at 1-50 (citing Mary Ann Beattie, 
The Story of Head Start (unpublished manuscript)). 
115. See Shriver, supra note 86, at 55. 
116. See Mroco EDUC. Assocs., supra note 45, at I-58. The start of the first Head Start 
demonstration project was marked by a massive public relations effort, which included a very 
visible role by First Lady Lady Bird Johnson. See id. 
117. See Shriver, supra note 86, at 55. 
118. Id. at I-52. 
119. Id. at I-64. 
120. The first Head Start guidelines were contained in a memo from Dr. Robert Cooke, 
chair of the Planning Committee, to Sargent Shriver, the head of OEO. This memo, which 
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These guidelines, which stood as the only authoritative statement of 
program policy until OEO issued the first Head Start Policy Manual 
in 1967,121 referred to parents as helpers, learners, and sources of 
information, but not as primary decisionmakers.122 
In 1966, in response both to local demands for more parent and 
community participation123 and to advocacy on the part of some 
CAP staff members,124 OEO issued proposed guidelines that di-
rected Head Start centers to establish "Policy Advisory Commit-
tees," to be made up of "consumers," staff, and representatives of 
the community. In addition, the proposal called for parents to have 
a veto power over basic administrative decisions such as budgeting 
and staff hiring.125 In a number of cities, local school boards op-
posed the proposed guidelines because they feared that the Advi-
sory Committees were a first step toward greater parental control 
over education policy more generally. As a consequence, OEO 
backed away from its initial position and, in 1967, issued final 
guidelines that retained the Advisory Committees as consultative 
bodies only denying them any veto power.126 
In the long run, a more important and contradictory feature of 
the 1967 policy manual was that it placed Head Start squarely 
within OEO's Community Action Program, and required a Head 
Start grantee in a community without a CAP to proceed "as if it 
were a community action agency."127 By virtue of this reiteration 
of Head Start's place within CAP, OEO solidified the statutory re-
quirement that programs seek the "maximum feasible participa-
tion" of parents.128 For the first time, an official Head Start 
document also spoke about parents as decisionmakers.129 
These decisions were followed in 1969 by the designation of a 
paid staff position within Head Start, the parent coordinator, whose 
was entitled "Recommendations for a Head Start Program by a Panel of Experts," is quoted 
extensively in Mrnco EDUC. Assocs., supra note 45, at I-62 to 1-64. 
121. See id. (discussing the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of 
Economic Opportunity, Manual 6108-1, Head Start Development Program: A Manual of 
Policies and Instructions (1967)). 
122. See id. at I-74 to 1-75; see also Valentine & Stark, supra note 44, at 303. 
123. See Valentine & Stark, supra note 44, at 304. 
124. See Mrnco EDuc. Assocs., supra note 45, at 1-65. 
125. Valentine & Stark, supra note 44, at 304. 
126. See id. 
127. Mrnco EDUC. Assocs., supra note 45, at I-69 to I-70. 
128. The efforts of OEO field inspectors, who "during the early days of OEO took as one 
of their main charges the implementation of the 'maximum feasible participation' " require-
ment, were probably a significant influence in this regard. Id. at I-67. 
129. Id. at I-74. 
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job it was to ensure the full participation of parents. Now, all the 
pieces were !n place to ignite a grassroots organizing effort that 
went far beyond the original liberal conception of parental role. As 
one history of Head Start tells the story: 
[A]s community pressure on public schools intensified, numerous 
"battles" ensued within local Head Start programs. PACs [Policy Ad-
visory Committees] attempted to control the parent coordinator; staff 
and parents fought over program content; parents criticized local 
school officials; and, finally, local Head Start - often allied with local 
CAP - battled regional CAP, often allied with local school officials. 
New community organizations were created to give parents and 
neighborhood residents a greater role in school policy. The Pyramid 
Councils in Minneapolis, the Community Councils in New Haven, 
and the Neighborhood School Boards in New York had their counter-
part in dozens of other cities where a militant parents' movement had 
developed. Simultaneously, threats to cut Head Start funds were used 
to confine parent involvement within safe bounds. According to the 
cultural-deficit model, parent "apathy" was a major obstacle to edu-
cating the poor. But now, as [Head Start staffer] Bessie Draper de-
scribes it, the staff "simply had no idea how to handle the numbers of 
poor persons who wanted to become involved in the program.:•130 
In 1970, in reaction to these local developments, federal Head 
Start officials issued new guidelines. For the first time, official pol-
icy spelled out in detail the role of parents as decisionmakers in 
Head Start, and granted them veto· power over staff hiring and fir-
ing decisions.131 Although some writers have argued that the draft-
ers of the 1970 revisions intended to limit any further expansion of 
the grassroots politics that had taken place in some localities, and 
were merely "formali[zing] specific and restricted parental decision-
making power ... [that] fell far short of the 'self-determination' 
which parents in the largest cities had demanded,"132 others have 
pointed out that the changes showed "a steady progression towards 
increased parental infiuence."133 Not only were parents given a 
veto power, but also the committees on which they served were no 
longer intended to operate in an advisory capacity: now, they were 
policymaking bodies.134 
130. Valentine & Stark, supra note 44, at 305. 
131. See id. at 305-07. 
132. Id. at 307. 
133. Mwco Eouc. Assocs., supra note 45, at I-78. 
134. See id. In addition, the introduction to the 1970 guidelines contained language re-
flecting a position more radical than the simple cultural-deficit perspective that had 
predominated five years earlier. The introduction explained the importance of parent partic-
ipation in the following terms: 
Successful parental involvement enters into every part of Head Start, influences other 
anti-poverty programs, helps bring about changes in institutions in the community, and 
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After 1970, funding cutbacks and general hostility from the 
Nixon administration led to retrenchment within many OEO pro-
grams.135 Of all the original OEO initiatives, Head Start was the 
most successful at retaining some of the participatory characteristics 
inherent in the notion of community action. Subsequent guidelines 
for Head Start continued to stress the role of parents as deci-
sionmakers as well as learners, 136 and although the program has 
long since ceased to be an engine for significant political transfor-
mation within the larger community,137 many Head Start centers 
have managed to perpetuate an internal ethic of collaboration and 
engagement across the role designations that divide clients from 
professionals in other social service agencies.13s 
For example, a 1978 study by Associate Control, Research, and 
Analysis, Inc. (ACRA) found that 89 percent of those serving on 
Head Start's policymaking councils were parents of current or for-
mer Head Start children.139 Moreover, the study indicated that 32 
percent of Head Start's staff were parents of Head Start children, 
and that parent volunteering was extensive.140 Other researchers 
have found that "the number of [Head Start] parents who have 
gone on to become CAP directors, Head Start directors, consul-
tants, teachers, officials in local and state governments, family day 
care providers, and business people is 'overwhelming' and 
'incalculable.' "141 
These data - both anecdotal and otherwise142 - indicate that, 
despite the failure of community activists to tum Head Start into a 
catalyst for broad social change, the program has managed to create 
and perpetuate insulated cells within which some of the key princi-
works toward altering the social conditions that have fanned the systems that surround 
the [economically] disadvantaged child and his family. 
Id. at 1-77. 
135. See Valentine & Stark, supra note 44, at 305; see also S.M. Miller & Ronnie Stein-
berg Ratner, The American Resignation: The New Assault on Equality, Soc. POLY. May/June 
1972, at 5. 
136. See Valentine & Stark, supra note 44, at 305. 
137. See id. at 307. 
138. It is worth mentioning that a study conducted in 1970 found that Head Start's influ-
ence in the larger community was being felt, and was correlated with the degree of parental 
involvement present in a particular Head Start center. Cf. O'KEEFE, supra note 48, at 11 
(discussing a study by Kirschner Associates, Inc., entitled A National Survey of the Impact of 
Head Start Centers on Community Institutions). 
139. See id. at 7. · 
140. See id. at 9. 
141. Id. at 13. 
142. Essentially no additional thorough research was undertaken until the fall of 1989, 
when a Silver Ribbon Panel was convened. See REPORT OF THE SILVER RmaoN PANEL, 
supra note 69. 
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pies of a participatory or "dialogic" community143 are practiced. 
The question these developments raise is how, during its first dec-
ade of operation, Head Start managed to avoid the development of 
rigid hierarchical structures so characteristic of other agencies 
within the welfare bureaucracy, and how, in more recent times, it 
has managed to retain the participatory norms that did arise during 
its early history. The answers to these questions, in tum, provide 
the starting point for a fuller analysis of the conflict between the 
local culture found within many Head Start centers and conven-
tional regulatory practices like those contained within the federal 
confidentiality law. 
III. THE OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITS OF LIBERAL LEGALISM: 
THE PROMISE OF NEW JURISPRUDENTIAL v OICES 
The ability of activists within Head Start to exploit available 
rhetorical and symbolic opportunities, to blunt official government 
policies inconsistent with local practice, and to sustain a grassroots 
movement for more than two decades· is a remarkable story. There 
are three related explanations - professionalism, political reform, 
and gender - for this history, and each helps to clarify the nature 
of the conflict between daily practice within Head Start and the for-
mal legal structure applicable to the recent substance-abuse-related 
activities of the Target Cities demonstration projects. Section ID.A 
provides a brief overview of the discussion of professionalism, polit-
ical reform, and gender. 
This Part is also an account of the opportunities, and also the 
very real limits, of liberal legalism in understanding the social world 
and the role that law can play in resolving the conflicts that inevita-
bly arise. A brief discussion of this topic follows a historical expla-
nation of the vibrancy of participation and governance within Head 
Start programs. Finally, this Part concludes with the suggestion that 
critical theory, because of the diversity of its methodology and con-
tent, has much to offer in response to the vexing problems raised by 
Head Start's substance-abuse-related activities. 
A. Professionalism, Political Reform, and Gender 
The first explanation for the development and persistence of the 
participatory institutional values and collaborative governance 
143. Joel F. Handler, Dependent People, the State, and the Modern/Postmodern Search for 
the Dialogic Community, 35 UCLA L. REv. 999, 1089-93 (1988) (exploring the possibility of 
"dialogism" in contemporary welfare agencies, in which people in "significantly unequal situ-
ations" are able to "relate to each other as equal moral agents"). 
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styles still found within Head Start centers involves the absence, at 
least until quite recently, of an entrenched network of credentialed 
professionals in the early childhood education field. A key element 
of Head Start's organizational style is the softening of distinctions 
between clients and service providers, between professionals and 
nonprofessionals.144 In contrast to the experience of legal services 
agencies that shared OEO's requirement of "maximum feasible 
participation,"145 parents and their advocates within Head Start did 
not face extensive staff resistance.146 Moreover, many Head Start 
personnel have been recruited from the ranks of Head Start par-
ents, and the "career ladder" approach to staff training has helped 
to close the distance between professionals, paraprofessionals, and 
parents participating as volunteers.141 
Interestingly, the development of this more participatory ethic 
within Head Start occurred during a period in which the social-
work profession was distancing itself from its historical relationship 
with social-welfare agencies and turning its attention to a new 
group of middle-class clients.148 As this trend away from commu-
nity-oriented service and reform and toward a more individualistic 
and psychodynamic social-work practice gained momentum, it cre-
ated something of a vacuum within institutions that served the 
poor. In many instances, this vacuum was filled by the agents and 
technicians of a developing welfare bureaucracy.149 In the case of 
Head Start, on the other hand, a more participatory model emerged 
in which staff and clients stood together in a shared institutional 
space.15° 
144. See supra text accompanying notes 44-51. 
145. EARL JoHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFoRM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE OEO 
LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM 108-12 {1974). 
146. See id.; see also Marc Feldman, Political Lessons: Legal Services For the Poor, 83 
GEO. LJ. 1529, 1541-42 (1995). It should be pointed out that in the early years an en-
trenched group of professionals, local teachers' groups and boards of education, did resist 
client involvement in decisionmaking. See supra text accompanying note 126. 
147. See supra text accompanying notes 44-49. 
148. For a good description and critique of this trend, see 0. Gursslin et al., Social Class 
and the Mental Health Movement, 7 Soc. PRoBs. 210 (1959). For another discussion, see 
Nathan E. Cohen, A Social Work Approach, in SOCIAL WoRK AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 362 
(Nathan E. Cohen ed., 1964). 
149. See Simon, supra note 53 (setting out a theory of bureaucracy within social welfare 
institutions characterized by "proletarianized" front-line workers, rigid rules, and a manage-
ment elite). 
150. This characterization is based upon the historical accounts cited above, see, e.g., 
Mmco Eouc. Assocs., supra note 45; PRoracr HEAD START, supra note 44, as well as my 
own observations working with a number of Head Start centers beginning in 1991. Professor 
Lucie White is currently engaged in an ethnographic study of parent governance in Head 
Start. I expect that her findings will be consistent with my own experience. See White, Client 
Involvement, supra note 46. 
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A second explanation for Head Start's distinctive internal ethos 
is that its failure to develop a more outward-directed reform agenda 
- a reform agenda focused on wider institutional change1s1 - un-
derstandably softened the impression that Head Start was likely to 
unsettle established social and political arrangements in the com-
munities it served. Here it is worth recalling that the most intense 
battles involving Head Start arose over questions of parental gov-
ernance when local school boards perceived a threat to their poli-
cymaking authority.152 Outside of the public education arena, 
which was the sphere of public policy most closely associated with 
Head Start's activities, however, those in positions of power ex-
pressed relatively little concern. 
The one significant exception to this general attitude of indiffer-
ence only helps to reinforce the basic point. By far, the most con-
troversial Head Start program over the years was the Child-
Development Group of Mississippi (CDGM).153 From its incep-
tion, the leaders of this program were deeply involved in the civil 
rights struggle occurring in Mississippi. Activists throughout the 
state saw Head Start as an organization capable of leading their 
effort to undermine the white power-structure in the state.154 As 
Sargent Shriver, then Director of OEO, has told the story: 
Down in Mississippi, there were a lot of people who looked upon 
Head Start and CDGM as a means of transferring substantial sums of 
money directly to the black people of the state for the first time - a 
way of empowering black people, and of mobilizing them on a state-
wide basis .... The money sent from Washington directly to CDGM 
to organize Head Start programs all over Mississippi was a mandate 
to go into every community in the state and organize the people polit-
ically through Head Start. As a consequence, what had been looked 
upon in the beginning by some in Mississippi, especially white people, 
as a harmless social program immediately became hostile intervention 
by the federal government, bent upon upsetting the social structure of 
Mississippi, specifically white supremacy. CDGM became a spear-
head of the civil-rights movement in Mississippi, and therefore bore 
151. See Valentine & Stark, supra note 44, at 308. As a general matter, critics charged 
that all of the OEO programs placed "too much emphasis on changing people" and "not 
enough emphasis" on "institutional change." Mmco Eouc. Assocs., supra note 45, at I-48. 
For a full discussion of this victory of liberalism over radicalism, see FRANCES Fox PlvIN & 
RICHARD A. Cr.owARD, REGULATING THE PooR: THE FUNcnoNs OF Punuc WELFARE 
(1971). 
152. See supra text accompanying note 126. 
153. For a powerful account of this movement, see POLLY GREENBERG, THE DEVIL HAs 
SLIPPERY SHOES: A BIASED BIOGRAPHY OF THE CHn.o DEVELOPMENT GROUP OF MlssIS-
SIPPI (1969). 
154. See Shriver, supra note 86, at 62. 
2356 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 93:2325 
the major brunt of the opposition of the white community in the state, 
and of its congressmen and senators in Washington.155 
After only its first year of operation, political opposition to 
CDGM, both locally and in Washington, led to the elimination of 
its funding. In Washington, opponents, including Senator John 
Stennis, had instituted a financial investigation and placed pressure 
on OEO to micromanage the activities underway in Mississippi. In 
order to avoid further political fallout that he believed might jeop-
ardize other OEO programs, Shriver terminated CDGM's federal 
funding and encouraged the formation of an alternative program in 
Mississippi that was willing to operate Head Start without an ex-
plicit political agenda.156 
B. Liberal Legalism and Its Limits 
The third, and most subtle, explanation for Head Start's organi-
zational structure and its insulation from significant intervention by 
the welfare bureaucracy, is that it has always been a program for 
and by poor women - many of them women of color - and their 
children. Due to the nature of the population Head Start serves 
and the nature of its agenda, the unconventional efforts of those 
involved in structuring and developing this project have not gener-
ally drawn the attention of policymakers. From the perspective of 
those outside of Head Start, this effort has been, at most, self-help 
on the part of poor women and their children, hardly a matter of 
great concern to those in positions of greater privilege and 
power.151 
155. Id. 
156. See id. at 63. 
157. It is one thing to talk about the relative inattention of policymakers to the lives of 
poor women and their children, it is quite another to speak of the fierce interest shown by 
those same policymakers toward the problems posed by impoverished women and children. 
In the former instance, the perspective is that of families living in poverty; in the latter it is 
the perspective of others whose interests may be affected for the worse by the fact that some 
number of women and their children live at the very margins of society. Valerie Polakow has 
explained this distinction in the following terms: 
The way in which we choose to talk about poverty - as a social problem, an urgent 
issue in need of attention, a dilemma, a menace, a threat to the society, a cost to the 
taxpayer, or, as one of my colleagues once stated, just "another variable of develop· 
ment" - creates a noise, followed by echoes that locate the invisible lives of poor 
women and their children. They, living out there in the unnamed landscapes, periodi-
cally swell into visibility as the poverty issue is targeted for public attention by compet-
ing political agendas. Poverty talk, however, is always a discourse about them. As they 
get closer and their proximity makes us uncomfortable, we clamor for laws to contain 
them, to regulate their space in relation to ours •.•. Their otherness places us "at risk"; 
yet it is we who have named them. We have both invented and named poverty. 
Valerie Polakow, The Other Motherhood: The Landscape of Single Mothers In Poverty, in 
L!vEs ON THE EDGE (1993), reprinted in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW: A ClvIL RmHrS 
READER 524-25 (Leslie Bender & Daan Braveman eds., 1995). 
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This harbored history of inattention is related to the absence of 
an entrenched group of professionals concerned about Head Start's 
activities, because both phenomena stem from a tendency in the 
dominant culture to locate "women's issues," defined here to in-
clude the care of children, within a "private" realm insulated from 
the larger "public" sphere.158 This distinction between public and 
private realms is fundamental to classical liberalism, and functions 
as a core element of liberal legal practice.159 
158. To the extent that Head Start activities have been associated with child rearing more 
generally, they have been treated as occurring within a domestic environment in which both 
"professionalism" and the legal regulation ordinarily intended for "public" activities is 
thought to be inappropriate or unnecessary. As Frances Olsen has made clear, it has been 
characteristic of the liberal tradition to organize social data into dualist categories, like pub-
lic-private, in which each pair is made up of a superior male category and an inferior female 
one. Frances Olsen, The Sex of Law, in THE Pouncs OF LAW: A PRooRESsIVE CRmoUE 
453-54 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990); see also Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Re-
form, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 
HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1373 (1988). While some feminists have accepted this dualist vision of 
social life, arguing instead for a nonhierarchical arrangement of the categories in order to 
overcome women's subordination, see, e.g., CAROL GILUGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VorCE: PsY-
CHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia 
in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WoMEN's 
L.J. 39 (1985). Olsen urges a more contextual form of analysis in which ~e dualisms them-
selves are challenged in specific concrete instances of gender oppression. Olsen, supra. 
159. For a general discussion and critique of this basic distinction, see Alan Freeman & 
Elizabeth Mensch, The Public-Private Distinction in American Law and Life, 36 BUFF. L. 
REv. 237 (1987); Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the PublidPrivate Distinc-
tion, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1349 (1982). 
It should be noted that classical liberal theory and liberal legalism, though related, are not 
the same. Classical liberal theory refers to a tradition of liberal political philosophy with 
roots going back to Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. For a good introduction to the 
foundations of liberal political theory, see MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS 
OF JUSTICE 1-65 (1982); Joseph W. Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurispru-
dence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wrs. L. REv. 975, 980. Liberal legalism, as that phrase 
is employed in this text, refers to a modified form of classical legalism that began to develop 
in the early decades of the twentieth century. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Jurisprudence of 
Brown and the Dilemmas of Liberalism, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 599 (1979). Classical 
legalism was the dominant jurisprudence during most of the nineteenth century. Its central 
features were an emphasis on individual autonomy and independence from the coercive au-
thority of the state, a belief in contractual exchange as a just distributive mechanism, and a 
reliance on the private law rules of contract, tort, and property. See William H. Simon, The 
Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1985). Following the 
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and culmi-
nating with the publication of Charles Reich's The New Property in 1964, this classical legal 
tradition underwent what some have called a "legal rights revolution." Handler, supra note 
143, at 1019. The resulting liberal legalist jurisprudence retained many of the features of 
classical liberalism, including an emphasis on individual autonomy and on property rights, 
but this liberal jurisprudence expanded the notion of property to include entitlements indi-
viduals could expect from government as well as from other private actors. As such, a "wide 
range of social harms ..• [were] converted into protectable legal rights." Id. at 1018. Among 
these newly discovered legal interests, a right to insist upon the confidentiality of alcohol and 
drug treatment information is typical. For a thorough discussion of this liberal jurisprudence, 
see Simon, supra, at 23-28. 
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According to the liberal paradigm, society is comprised of ra-
tional, egoistic individuals.160 When citizens interact with one an-
other in the public sphere, classical liberal theory assumes that they 
will pursue their self-interested objectives by way of arms-length 
dealings.161 In its pure form, classical liberal theory assumes that 
relatively unfettered self-interested interactions within the public 
sphere will generate the most good for society in the aggregate.162 
This assumption is central to liberal legalism, in which the concept 
of contractual exchange is the norm for public interaction.163 
Within classical liberalism's private realms, by contrast, the 
norms of affiliative relationship and regard for others replace the 
mechanism of arms-length bargaining between autonomous individ-
uals. In the private sphere, people are presumed to engage with 
family and friends in ways that create and respect interpersonal vul-
nerability, foster nurturing and supportive relationships, and rely 
upon trust and temper self-interest.164 
The role of law in the liberal conception is formed by reference 
to this strong dichotomy between the public and private realms.16s 
160. See Simon, supra note 159, at 9-10. 
161. See generally RICHARD A. PosNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981); see also 
Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Polit-
ical V1Sions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REv. 384 (1985); Richard A. 
Posner, The Ethical Significance of Free Choice: A Reply To Professor West, 99 HARV. L. 
REv. 1431 (1986). 
162. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 497-502 (2d ed. 1977). 
163. See Lesnick, supra note 85, at 423; Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 
STAN. L. REv. 617, 628 (1990); Singer, supra note 159, at 983. 
164. The United States Supreme Court has opined that: 
[C]hoices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must be se-
cured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in 
safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme •••• 
. . . Moreover, the constitutional shelter afforded such relationships reflects the reali-
zation that individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with 
others. 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-19 (1984); see also Ronald Dworkin, 
Liberalism, in PUBuc AND PruvATE MORALITY 113 (Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978); Rhode, 
supra note 163, at 628. 
165. Any effort to speak about the public-private distinction is bound to run into termi-
nological confusion. Some writers have suggested that the construct may have no meaning at 
all, see, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 159, and others have argued that the very instability of the 
boundary between public and private life serves as a principal occasion for the operation of 
constitutional adjudication, see, e.g., Louis M. Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: 
The Uneasy Case for a Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 Y ALB L.J. 
1006 (1987). Perhaps, some of the confusion stems from the fact that writers often employ 
the public-private language to evoke a distinction between governmental and nongovern-
mental spheres of influence or activity. Pursuant to this usage, it might be thought that the 
activity of simple contracting between nongovernmental business entities occurs within the 
private sphere. As scores of writers have made clear, however, even simple contracts take on 
a special meaning in law because of the availability of government-sponsored enforcement 
mechanisms that include forums for the litigation of disputes and authority for the execution 
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In the most general terms, liberal legalism seeks to facilitate inter-
actions between individual citizens by protecting private property 
and enforcing contractual obligations, and it seeks to protect indi-
viduals' freedom to engage in autonomous choice by insulating pri-
vate life from the intrusion of overzealous government officials. 
The law is regarded as capable of accomplishing both of these tasks 
through the application of formal, abstract rules that limit official 
discretion, carve out zones of privacy, and foster free choice.166 
The lack of participation in Head Start by professionals, how-
ever, together with the relative insulation of this enterprise from 
the larger political sphere, has contributed to the development of 
local cultures that are fundamentally inconsistent with the liberal 
vision of a public institution.167 Parents, teachers, and administra-
tors tend not to interact at arms-length, and tend not to rely on 
formal procedural mechanisms in order to resolve disputes and 
form policy. Instead, the various actors within these "communities" 
of judgments. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 159, at 986-93. A more satisfactory approach, 
which takes account of a great deal of the confusion inherent in the public-private dichotomy, 
has been offered by Professor Seidman, who argues that the distinction is best understood in 
tenns of three "interlocking dilemmas." The first dilemma treats the tension between the 
"universalist" and "particularist" values we all hold, the second involves our competing inter-
ests in governmental intervention and libertarianism, and the third concerns the relationship 
between our simultaneous impulses toward openness and secrecy. Seidman, supra, at 1007. 
Although he is not explicit about this point, it would seem that a good deal of the instability 
in the public-private distinction, which takes place along the three dimensions Seidman sets 
out, is due to the tendency of liberal thought to regard individuals as autonomous and 
presocial. See, e.g., SANDEL, supra note 159. Within that frame of reference, it makes some 
sense to talk about a clear divide between configurations of autonomous individuals that are 
open and universalist, like a meeting of the local school board or the U.S. Congress, and 
those that are private and particularistic, like a family dinner at Thanksgiving. If, on the 
other hand, one regards individuals not as "fixed entities defined prior to and independent of 
social relationships," but as dynamic and contingent, as plastic and perpetually in a state of 
redefinition as they negotiate social interaction, Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the 
Boundaries of the Self, 105 HAR.v. L. REv. 959, 961 (1992), then talk of mutually exclusive 
public and private spheres becomes incoherent. Moreover, a legal regime that insists upon 
treating individuals as fixed and presocial and that organizes itself into public and private 
domains, is destined, by virtue of its failure to recognize an essential nexus between individu-
als and groups, between the public and the private, "to constrict the self's boundaries and to 
encourage the enactment of a reduced and shrivelled self." Id. at 962. It is this reduced or 
shrivelled sense of self that I refer to infra as an unauthentic, alienated legal subject. See 
infra text accompanying notes 177-81. 
166. Handler, supra note 143, at 1018; Steven Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal 
Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REv. 1103 (1983). 
167. Head Start represents an alternative institutional model in which "locally centered 
institutional networks ••• are managed, insofar as possible, through democratic rather than 
bureaucratic processes at the local level." It is, therefore, a potentially better environment 
for "teaching clients skills of civic involvement," for "awaken[ing] their empathy for others' 
concerns," and for "wider nonnative commitments to individual self-determination and a 
democratic social life." White, Client Involvement, supra note 46, at 14. For a more recent 
discussion indicating the complicated and multilayered kind of community this institutional 
form creates, see Lucie White, Ordering Voice: Rhetoric and Democracy in Project Head 
Start, in THE RHETORIC OF LAW 185 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1994). 
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are more likely to engage one another out of a sense of common 
purpose and to find solutions within the context of their ongoing 
relationships.168 
The federal confidentiality laws and regulations, on the other 
hand, are squarely within the liberal legal tradition. They presume 
a regulated setting in which individual clients will need formal legal 
protection in order to ward off the incursions of overzealous public 
actors. Thus, they confer upon substance-abuse patients a set of 
legal rights designed to safeguard each individual's freedom of 
action by carving out a zone of privacy. The laws presume that 
treatment providers, in contrast, are arbitrary and unreliable bu-
reaucrats in need of the restraint provided by clearly delineated 
legal rules. Under this scheme, the application of formal proce-
dures governing the dissemination of confidential information vin-
dicates an individual patient's right to privacy.169 
Unfortunately, these formal confidentiality rules do not fit well 
within the day-to-day operation of many Head Start centers. This 
disjunction can best be understood,, and, perhaps, managed, by em-
ploying the work of critical theorists who have attempted to ana-
lyze, critique, and depart from the basic paradigm of liberal 
legalism.110 Fundamental to these alternative accounts is a descrip-
tion of desire, preference, and action directly at odds with the class-
ical liberal notion of autonomous individualism. Rather than 
viewing preferences as intrinsic and presocial, much critical theory 
starts with the premise that individual choices are formed within a 
social context. 111 Critical theorists posit that an individual's web of 
affiliations and group identifications constructs her identity within 
the larger culture. Moreover, while classical liberalism regards so-
cial exchanges as static interactions between fixed, atomistic enti-
ties, the alternative critical account describes social intercourse as a 
fluid, continual process of self-definition and redefinition.172 Indi-
vidual agendas are not comprised of privately developed desires 
and preferences brought into the public sphere by egoistic selves; 
168. See supra Part II. 
169. See supra Part I. 
170. While reference is made here to "critical theorists," what follows is drawn from a 
number of related jurisprudential currents, including critical legal studies, critical feminism, 
and critical race theory. 
171. See generally MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 66-67 (1987); 
Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to its Origins and Underpinnings, 36 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 505, 506-09 (1986). 
172. See KATHYE. FERGUSON, THE FEMINIST CASE AGAINST BUREAUCRACY 196 (1984); 
see also SANDEL, supra note 159; Dan-Cohen, supra note 165. 
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rather, individual lives gain meaning within the rich context of 
ongoing social discourse.113 
An important contribution of critical theory has been its atten-
tion to the role of formal legal rights within liberal legalism. Early 
critical legal studies writers argued that the pursuit of an individual-
rights-based agenda might serve to disempower those in society 
who are already most vulnerable.174 A rights-based approach not 
only legitimizes structural forms of inequality,175 but also under-
mines opportunities for collective engagement and political 
activity.176 · 
For present purposes, however, the most important element of 
this postrealist critique111 is the claim that a liberal regime of indi-
vidual rights transforms concrete social settings into abstract legal 
formulations.178 In part, this process of abstraction is necessary 
given the level of generality at which uniform legal prescriptions 
operate.119 In other respects, it is a function of liberal legalism's 
inability to manage human relationships within a larger social con-
text. The abstraction of liberal legalism not only disables attempts 
to resolve social conflicts, but also reduces individuals to categorical 
types.180 Individual human actors embedded in a specific and 
173. Critical scholars have offered more than a complicated account of "public" life; they 
have also challenged classical liberalism's rather simplified picture of the "private" sphere. 
In the place of an idealized version of "family life" in which the state rarely if ever intrudes, 
government policies with respect to reproductive· choice, child care, marital property, and 
welfare are described as exerting a powerful influence on the ways in which "families" ar-
range themselves. See, e.g., Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 835 (1985). In addition, a number of writers have pointed out that deci-
sions on the part of the state not to intervene in "private" matters have also had a profound 
impact on the lives of those made vulnerable by larger societal processes. Thus, noninterven-
tionist policies with respect to marital rape and other forms of domestic violence clearly have 
had the effect of legitimating abusive relationships between people of unequal power. See 
id.; see also Rhode, supra note 163, at 631. 
174. See, e.g., Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1, 
33 (1984). 
175. See Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review, in THE Pouncs OF 
LAW, supra note 158, at 96; Tushnet, supra note 171, at 516. 
176. Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 174, at 33-40. 
177. See Andrew Altman, Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin, 15 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 205 (1986). 
178. See Jurgen Habermas, Law as Medium and.Law as Institution, in DILEMMAS OF LAW 
IN nm WELFARE STATE 203, 210 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1986). 
179. Rhode, Olsen, and other critical theorists have "not[ed] that rights discourse cannot 
resolve social conflict but can only restate it in somewhat abstract, conclusory form." Rhode, 
supra note 163, at 633. 
180. In describing the impact of the welfare bureaucracy upon social life, Joel Handler 
has explained that 
[p]reviously, socialization - moral in the family,. pedagogical in the schools - took 
place through communicative action. Legalization supplants this communicative context 
with legal norms; relations become formalized; family members, pupils, teachers, and 
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unique web of affiliations and marked by a specific and unique life 
history are reconfigured as "legal subjects" - as categorical types 
alienated one from another and from their socially situated 
selves.181 
Several associated factors drive this process of increasing ab-
straction, and each can be identified in the application of the fed-
eral confidentiality rules to Head Start's substance-abuse project. 
The first is liberal legalism's preoccupation with individual entitle-
ment. Because formal legal rights are defined by reference to indi-
viduals and conferred upon atomistic legal subjects, the process of 
vindicating those rights necessarily treats the holder of those rights 
as a decontextualized actor.182 As noted earlier, in the Head Start 
setting the liberal perspective has resulted in confidentiality regula-
tions designed to protect the privacy of individual patients. The 
regulations do not, on their face, allow the treatment provider to 
regard a chemically dependent individual's family as "the patient" 
for purposes of sharing important information within the pro-
gram.183 The success of Head Start's interventions with substance-
abusing parents, by contrast, depends upon the ability of classroom 
teachers, parent liaisons, mental health workers, and others to en-
gage as a team with the adult addict and her children and, perhaps, 
other family members and friends as a constellation of related peo-
ple whose problems are deeply intertwined and whose interdepen-
dence must be acknowledged to fashion effective solutions.184 
Similarly, the federal confidentiality provisions reflect liberal le-
galism's abhorrence of official discretion.18s These provisions rely 
upon formal substantive rules prohibiting the disclosure of patient-
identifying information and strict procedural requirements gov-
parents now encounter each other as legal subjects. The relationships are converted to 
the medium of law but the abstractness of law applies without regard to the specific 
needs and interests of the persons involved. 
Handler, supra note 143, at 1045; see also Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights·Con-
sciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEXAS L REv. 1563 (1984). 
181. See Gabel, supra note 180; see also Habermas, supra note 178, at 211; Handler, supra 
note 143, at 1044. 
182. See Horwitz, supra note 159, at 604 {describing a "political and legal culture of indi-
vidualism that defines a problem exclusively in terms of the rights of individuals" tends to 
"strip individuals of their group identity"); see also Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 
TEXAS L. REv. 1363, 1382-83 (1984). 
183. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56. 
184. See supra text accompanying notes 57-61. 
185. See Simon, supra note 159, at 27-28 {the vision of public administration within the 
"New Property Jurisprudence" includes "formality," "bureaucratization," and the "proletari-
anization" of staff); see also Handler, supra note 143, at 1060; Charles Reich, The New Prop-
erty, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 783-85 {1964). 
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erning patient consent, internal communications, and the like. This 
effort to limit the range of discretion available to treatment person-
nel regarding the communication of sensitive information has the 
potential to impair the "communicative context" within Head 
Start.1s6 
Unfortunately, the conventional picture of individual patients 
enmeshed in a bureaucratic apparatus and in need of explicit legal 
protection against arbitrary official power fails to capture daily 
practice within many Head Start centers. In place of powerful and 
distanced bureaucrats, Head Start parents are more likely to en-
counter staff members operating in a distinctly antibureaucratic 
fashion, with little hierarchical distance. Indeed, though the liberal 
legalist premises of the confidentiality regulations assume a diver-
gence of interest between patients and program staff that may jeop-
ardize the well-being of disempowered patients in the absence of 
legal regulation, the history of and actual behavior in many Head 
Start centers suggest a strong commonality of interest and experi-
ence among parents and staff. This commonality helps to facilitate 
- and often encourages - interactions based upon trust and 
care.187 To the extent that this programmatic picture of human ac-
tors known to and engaged with one another is accurate, the appli-
cation of formal legal prescriptions and procedures may set off a 
dynamic capable of undermining empathy and cooperation, and 
may lead to increased hierarchy.188 
A final element of liberal legalism reflected in the confidential-
ity laws and regulations is its assumption that public life is most 
productive when it operates on the basis of individual freedom of 
choice. According to the liberal paradigm, society is made up of 
egoistic, self-interested decisionmakers. The way to create the most 
good for the greatest number of people is to encourage arms-length 
transactions between parties seeking to maximize their individual 
preferences. As Robin West has explained: "A law which either 
facilitates or mimics consensual transactions between freely choos-
186. Handler, supra note 143, at 1045. 
187. This empirical observation corresponds with the theoretical descriptions offered by 
Annette Baier. See Annette Baier, Trust and Antitrust, 96 Ennes 231 {1986). Baier's work is 
a systematic effort to show how trust - as opposed to contract - operates in relationships 
between people who hold unequal shares of power. Her argument is that parties are assisted 
in trusting one another, and in reposing confidence, when they act to further a "common 
good." Id. at 242-46. 
188. See Handler, supra note 143, at 1059. 
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ing individuals is a good law on this model, while a law which frus-
trates such transactions is a bad law."189 
The centrality. of this principle of liberalism is apparent in the 
federal regulations' extensive use of individual patient consent as a 
mechanism for regulating the availability of confidential informa-
tion.190 Once again, however, the poor fit between the law's essen-
tial animating premise - that individuals only consent to 
transactions that increase their welfare - and the concrete experi-
ence of those whose consent is to be requested, especially women 
who may be inclined to "consent" to transactions in order to in-
crease the welfare of others, makes the application of this law to the 
Head Start context problematic. 
Robin West's work has explored the consequence for women of 
liberal legalism's persistent use of consent as the pivot around 
which daily transactions occur. West's methodological approach is 
"phenomenological," for she initiates her analysis with women's ac-
tual experiences and desires rather than with an abstract commit-
ment to freedom or equality.191 By grounding her analysis in the 
concrete data of women's internal lives, West is able to suggest that 
liberalism's core normative claim, "that human beings consent to 
transactions in order to maximize their welfare, "192 may in fact be a 
false description, at least insofar as women are concerned. 
Counterposed against the "liberal self" engaged in consensual 
transactions in order to vindicate self-interest, West offers up the 
"giving self," which she describes as a characteristically female per-
sona who "consents" to transactions not necessarily in her interest 
in order to maximize the welfare of others.193 West makes no claim 
that the difference between the "liberal male self" and the "giving 
female self" is intrinsic; rather, she suggests a "causal hypothesis" 
based upon the pervasive threat of sexual violence all women 
face.194 Her argument, in essence, is that women respond to the 
ever-present potential of violent male sexuality by redefining them-
selves as "giving selves," in order to manage the constant fear of 
being violated. "Most simply, a woman will define herself as a 'giv-
ing self' so that she will not be violated. She defines herself as a 
189. Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Bedonie Lives: A Phenomenological Cri· 
tique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S LJ. 81, 91 (1987). 
190. See supra text accompanying notes 29-34. 
191. West, supra note 189, at 87-88. 
192. Id. at 92. 
193. Id. at 90-93. 
194. Id. at 94. 
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being who 'gives' sex, so that she will not become a being from 
whom sex is taken. "195 
Importantly, the danger that energizes a woman's transforma-
tion into a "giving self" is likely to vary considerably from one per-
son to the next, and is likely to be experienced differently 
depending upon a particular woman's other characteristics.196 
West's phenomenological methodology and feminist voice is power-
ful precisely because it builds theoretical insight out of the concrete 
data of internal experience. Because this descriptive enterprise 
must aggregate the experiences of individual women, however, it 
raises the possibility of homogenizing or "essentializing" all 
women's experiences.197 Ironically, one strategy for managing this 
methodological tension is both to broaden and particularize the 
account. 
The broadening may be accomplished by fitting West's "causal 
hypothesis" about the effects on women of pervasive male violence 
into a framework offered by radical feminists' observations about 
power and hierarchy in general.198 West believes that women re-
constitute themselves as "giving selves" in order to control the per-
sistent fear of acquisitive male sexuality. This fear is invisible to 
men because the danger from which it derives is not part of men's 
experience and because the very act by women of managing the 
fear disguises its true nature.199 In the end, this invisibility inflicts a 
double injury upon women: it not only hides the pain of a dimin-
ished sexual autonomy, it also obscures the ways in which liber-
alism's "ethic of consent"200 potentially disadvantages women in all 
195. Id. at 96. 
196. See Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: 
A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist 
Politics, 1989 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 139; Marlee Kline, Race, Racism, and Feminist Legal Theory, 
12 HAR.v. WoMEN's LJ. 115 (1989). 
197. Rhode, supra note 163, at 624-25. See generally ELIZABETH V. SPEIMAN, !NESSEN· 
TIAL WoMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT 187 (1988). Patricia Wil-
liams has offered an interesting alternative critique of "consent" that does not rely upon 
claims with respect to the social position of all women. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE 
ALCHEMY Qp RACE AND RIGHTS 32-34 (1991). 
198. See, e.g., Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An 
Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515 (1982); Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method 
and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983); Nadine Taub & Elizabeth 
M. Schneider, Perspectives on Women's Subordination and the Role of Law, in Pouucs OF 
LAW, supra note 158, at 117. 
199. See West, supra note 189, at 94-97. 
200. Id. at 92. 
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of those settings in which they consent to transactions from a posi-
tion of subordination.201 
The point here is speculative, but of critical importance to this 
argument. If West is correct in her description of how women re-
spond to the pervasive danger of sexual violence, it is reasonable to 
conclude that many women will respond in a similar fashion to 
other threatened incursions of their autonomy by those who hold 
positions of superior power. Thus, it is possible that a woman who 
has reconstituted herself as a "giving self" out of fear of male vio-
lence, and who finds herself in an institutional setting in which 
other demands are being made upon her by bureaucrats acting with 
official authority, will also "consent" to those demands without re-
gard to her self-interest. 
If this speculation holds weight, then the role of patient consent 
as a central element within the federal confidentiality laws becomes 
problematic.202 In the context of Head Start, the patient whose 
consent is to be obtained is likely to be a poor woman of color 
whose position in society is marked by a complex multiplicity of 
"selves. "203 Whether she will be able to grant consent in a way that 
honors her self-interest will turn on a range of factors, including the 
social position of the person requesting her consent, the system of 
power relationships present, and the alternatives available to her in 
light of those power dynamics.204 
201. It is unclear whether West means to apply her analysis this broadly, to include "con-
sensual" transactions that have nothing directly to do with sexuality. There is language in the 
article, however, to support this fuller application. 
In a deep sense (too deep: she tends to forget it), this transformation is consensual: she 
"consents" to being a "giving self" - the dependent party in a comparatively protective 
relationship - for self-regarding liberal reasons; she consents in order to control the 
danger both inside and outside of the relationship, and in order to suppress the fear that 
danger engenders. Once redefined, however, and once within those institutions that sup-
port the definition, she becomes a person who gives her consent so as to ensure the other's 
happiness (not her own) ••• and ultimately so as to obey the other's commands. In other 
words, she embraces a self-definition and a motive for acting which is the direct antithe-
sis of the internal motivational life presupposed by liberalism. 
Id. at 96-97 (emphasis added). 
202. Perhaps the assumption that drug or alcohol abuse patients are capable of protecting 
themselves through informed consent makes sense when applied to middle-class, white 
males. Perhaps it even makes sense when applied to middle-class, white women who, though 
subordinate in terms of gender relationships, may feel no particular coercion in their interac-
tions with a treating physician, social worker, or drug counselor. 
203. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. Rnv. 
581, 584 (1990). 
204. See Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, Ffl MICH. L. RBv. 797, 836 (1989). As 
noted earlier, a relatively nonhierarchical organizational structure characterizes many Head 
Start centers. See supra Part II. Nevertheless, to the extent that any power differentials are 
present in the interactions between parents and staff, the kinds of distortion described by 
West with respect to consent are also likely to occur. 
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The patterns of subordination that shape women's experiences 
intersect with patterns of subordination based upon race, class, and 
sexual orientation.205 West's critique of liberal legalism has great 
explanatory power because it makes clear that arms-length consen-
sual transactions do not necessarily yield satisfactory outcomes, es-
pecially when the transacting parties are of unequal power. West's 
work on consent makes plain the partial and contingent nature of 
individual "free" choice. This recognition of the socially con-
structed nature of human wants and desires will require those inter-
ested in legal reform to adopt what some have termed a 
"contextualized" approach, in which the material circumstances and 
interior lives of those subject to a given legal regime are more fully 
considered.206 
C. The Promise of Critical Theory and Practice 
Within the Head Start setting, the question is how to arrange 
relationships among parents and staff so as to encourage a process 
that empowers participants and helps them "to construct them-
selves in a society that [has] denied them full selves."207 More par-
ticularly, the question is how, if at all, the law should be employed 
in Head Start communities to help manage the dissemination of 
highly charged information about the alcoholism or drug addiction 
of parents whose lives are situated within a complex web of over-
lapping roles and relationships. 
One approach, which has been implied in the above critique of 
liberal legalism, would be to minimize the influence of individualis-
tic, rights-based prescriptions. This approach would recognize the 
disruption and alienation likely to flow from rigidly conferring a 
right to privacy upon individuals. Instead of presuming the authen-
ticity of individual patient consent and the societal value of self-
interested, arms-length bargaining, parents in consultation with 
others with whom they have genuine, engaged relationships would 
205. See Crenshaw, supra note 196. 
206. In practice, this call for "contextualized" work means that judgments about how best 
to proceed at a given decisional moment should be made on the basis of actual social prac-
tice, as fully described and revealed as possible. Central to this process of "locat[ing] judg-
ment within the patterns of social practice," Rhode, supra note 163, at 626, is the use of a 
narrative methodology. Storytelling is a means for grounding the work of law and legal the-
ory in the daily lives of those whose experiences might otherwise be treated as marginal. See, 
e.g., Patricia Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY WoMEN's 
L.J. 191 {1990); Leigh Leonard, A Missing Voice in Feminist Legal Theory: The Heterosexual 
Presumption, 12 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 39 (1990); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to 
Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, P:l MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989). 
207. Harris, supra note 203, at 613. 
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make choices about the handling of sensitive information. Staff 
would be treated, and expected to behave, not as distant bureau-
crats but as partners in a healing process. Rather than relying upon 
legal entitlements to confidentiality to encourage substance-abusing 
parents to seek help, staff members and other parents would build 
upon human connections already in place within the Head Start 
center as the primary means by which to overcome the denial inher-
ent in alcoholism and other forms of drug addiction.2os 
A review of the small but growing literature addressing women 
with alcohol and other drug problems helps to shed some light on 
why such an approach might make sense in the case of the Head 
Start substance abuse initiative. This literature suggests that 
women alcoholics and addicts tend to present different clinical char-
acteristics than their male counterparts, and tend to respond differ-
ently than men to traditional forms of treatment.209 These 
differences are significant because the statutes and regulations gov-
erning the confidentiality of treatment records presume treatment 
facilities geared toward the characteristics and needs of male sub-
stance abusers.210 Most of the parents who receive services at Head 
208. See generally Margaret H. Bean, Denial and the Psychological Complications of Al· 
coholism, in DYNAMIC APPROACHES TO THE UNDERSTANDING AND TREATMENT OF ALCO-
HOLISM 55 (Margaret H. Bean & Nonnan E. Zinberg eds., 1981). 
Recognizing that liberal practice maintains an overly rigid distinction between the public 
and private realms, this approach might rely upon a process not unlike the feminist method-
ology of "consciousness-raising" to help participants understand "the social dimension of 
individual experience and the individual dimension of social experience." Elizabeth M. 
Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 589, 603 (1986). The goal of this group work might be to assist individual 
parents to see that their "private" struggles associated with drugs or alcohol are likely to be 
shared by others in the group, and that through their empathic support for others they might 
be enabled to assert increased control in their own lives. Employing a methodology in which 
"risk-taking and vulnerability [are valued] over caution and detachment," in which 
"[h]onesty is valued above consistency, [and] teamwork over self-sufficiency," Katharine T. 
Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REv. 829, 864 (1990), this approach might 
well bold greater promise for assisting addicted Head Start parents than an undertaking 
structured around the liberal premises of the federal confidentiality laws and regulations. 
209. See generally Sheila B. Blume, Alcohol and Drug Problems in Women: Old Atti-
tudes, New Knowledge, in TREATMENT CHOICES FOR ALCOHOLISM AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE 
183 (H.B. Milkinan & L.I. Sederer eds., 1990); Peter G. Fellios, Alcoholism in Women: 
Causes, Treatment, and Prevention, in ALCOHOLISM AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE IN SPECIAL 
POPULATIONS 11 (Gary W. Lawson & Ann W. Lawson eds., 1989); Andrea Halliday & 
Booker Bush, Women and Alcohol Abuse, in ALCOHOLISM: A GUIDE FOR THE PRIMARY 
CARE PHYSICIAN 176 (Henrietta N. Barnes ed., 1987); Linda J. Penniman & Jacqueline Ag-
new, Women, Work and Alcohol, 4 OCCUPATIONAL MED. 263 (1989); Helen E. Ross, Alcohol 
and Drug Abuse in Treated Alcoholics: A Comparison of Men and Women, 13 ALCOHOLISM: 
CuNICAL & EXPERJMmofrAL RBsEARCH 810 {1989); Steven Schenker & K. Vmcent Speeg, 
Risk of Alcohol Intake in Men and Women: All May Not Be Equa~ 322 NEW ENG. J. MBo. 
127 {1990). 
210. See supra section I.A. 
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Start centers are women,211 and the chief organizational features of 
Head Start are distinctively unlike traditional drug- and alcohol-
abuse treatment programs.212 
Among the reported differences between men and women who 
are substance abusers, several are particularly relevant to a discus-
sion of the needs of Head Start parents. Researchers and clinicians 
have reported that the patterns of substance abuse exhibited by ad-
dicted women tend to be related more closely to the drinking and 
drug-abuse patterns of their spouses or significant others than is 
typical for male addicts or alcoholics.213 Female substance abusers 
often exhibit higher levels of anxiety and depression, and lower 
self-esteem, than their male counterparts.214 In addition, the occur-
rence of family trauma, especially childhood physical and sexual 
abuse, has been found prevalent among substance-abusing 
women,215 and a strong correlation has been shown between the 
presence of ongoing, violent, intimate relationships and alcoholism 
treatment outcomes for women.216 Because of persistent and sexist 
stereotypes about women who abuse alcohol and other drugs, in-
cluding the notion that they are especially promiscuous or sexually 
aggressive,217 many more women than men tend to drink and use 
211. See supra section IIl.B. 
212. See supra section J.B. 
213. Thus, treatment outcomes for women often depend upon whether the patient's 
spouse or significant other is engaged in ongoing substance abuse. See Blume, supra note 
209, at 193. 
214. One study found that 19% of the women who were alcoholic or alcohol dependent 
also fulfilled the criteria for a lifetime diagnosis of major depression. This figure compared 
with 5% of the men studied and 7% of women in the population generally. See Sheila B. 
Blume, Alcohol and Other Drug Problems in Women, in SUBSTANCE ABusE: A COMPRE-
HENSIVE TEXTBOOK 798 (Joyce H. Lowinson et al eds., 2d ed. 1992) (discussing Michie Hes-
selbrock et al., Psychopathology in Hospitalized Alcoholics, 42 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 
1050 (1985)); see also CoRRIOAN, supra note 60; Linda J. Beckman, Self-Esteem of Women 
Alcoholics, 39 J. STUD. ALCOHOL 491 (1978). 
215. For example, in one study, 67% of the sample of alcoholic women reported that they 
had been the victims of sexual abuse as children. See Bi::enda A. Miller et al., The Role of 
Childhood Sexual Abuse in the Development of Alcoholism in Women, 2 VIOLENCE & VIC-
TIMS 157, 163 (1987). 
216. One study of 44 female alcoholics found strong correlations between a childhood 
history of family violence on the one hand and violence in partner relationships as an adult 
and outcome of substance abuse treatment on the other. The data showed that childhood 
violence explained 11 % of the total variance in treatment outcomes, and ongoing partner 
violence after treatment increased the outcome variance to 25%. The author of the study 
concluded that "the results of the multiple regression analysis suggest that remaining with a 
violent partner after treatment may be most predictive of negative treatment outcome in this 
group of female alcoholics." Brit Haver, Female alcoholics: W. The relationship between 
family violence and outcome 3-10 years after treatment, 15 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA 
SCANDINAVICA 449, 452-53 (1987). 
217. See CoRRIOAN, supra note 60, at 63. 
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drugs in private.218 This tendency to hide their substance abuse not 
only makes the identification and diagnosis of women addicts more 
difficult, it also exacerbates the sense of guilt and shame they are 
likely to feel, as they internalize the same stereotypes that drive 
them into hiding.219 
Not surprisingly, chemically dependent women who do seek 
treatment are more likely to be motivated to obtain help because of 
family pressures or health problems; men are more often pushed 
into treatment as a consequence of employment or criminal difficul-
ties.220 In fact, many of the differences presented by female sub-
stance abusers as compared to their male counterparts tend to 
translate into different treatment needs.221 .For example, clinicians 
report that effective treatment of women often depends on ob-
taining an accurate history of physical or sexual abuse or both, as 
well as the availability of same-gender therapy groups so that ongo-
ing psychological effects from that abuse can be explored fully.222 
Group processes focusing upon the internalized guilt and shame ex-
perienced by many sexual assault survivors, and by many chemi-
cally dependent women,223 can play a powerful role in helping 
participants begin to cope with a disempowering sense of isolation. 
The recognition that they are not alone in having experienced as-
saultive relationships or in struggling with alcohol and other drugs 
may assist some women to sort out their own responsibility for past 
and future choices, as well as the responsibility of others for their 
lives' circumstances.224 
Because the spouses or significant others of chemically depen-
dent women may have their own alcohol or drug problems, success 
in treatment frequently will depend upon the effective evaluation 
218. Because drinking, especially heavy drinking, is generally held to be less acceptable 
for women than for men, women are said to feel more stigma and shame because of 
society's nonacceptance of the intoxicated woman. Women are thought to differ from 
men because they are more likely to be lone, secretive drinkers. 
Id. at 3 (citations omitted); see also Edith S. Lisansky, Alcoholism in Women: Social and 
Psychological Concomitants, 18 Q.J. STUD. ALCOHOL 588, 605 (1957). 
219. See Edith S. Lisansky Gomberg, Alcoholic Women in Treatment: The Question of 
Stigma and Age, 23 ALCOHOL & ALCOHOUSM 507, 511 (1988); see also Blume, supra note 
209. 
220. See CoRRioAN, supra note 60, at 3; Blume, supra note 209, at 188. 
221. See, e.g., Brenda V. Smith, Improving Substance Abuse Treatment for Women, 24 
CuwuNoHousE REv. 490 {1990) {describing distinct needs of pregnant, addicted women). 
222. See Blume, supra note 214, at 794, 801-02. 
223. See id. at 801; Lisansky Gomberg, supra note 219. 
224. Cf. Blume, supra note 214, at 801. 
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and treatment of family members.225 Looking past the links be-
tween chemically dependent women and their immediate partners, 
however, several studies have found that treatment outcomes for 
substance-abusing women often will turn on whether a number of 
other supportive relationships are available to them.226 Once again, 
intervention and therapeutic practices that build upon social net-
works that may already be in place at the Head Start center are 
likely to be far more effective for many women than traditional 
forms of treatment that are more individualistic in nature. 
More broadly, the interwoven effects of pervasive sexism, pov-
erty, and chemical dependency must be addressed if treatment is to 
be effective.227 The simple avoidance of sexist, heterosexist,228 and 
racist229 stereotypes, though an important first step, may not be a 
sufficient modification to the traditional forms of treatment other-
wise available to many chemically dependent women in Head Start. 
In a recent article, Lucie White draws upon her field work to tell 
the story of one Head Start mother's efforts to obtain "psychic re-
lief" from the harshness of her everyday life. 230 According to 
White, a familiar strategy for dealing with a persistently 
subordinated status is to "escap[e] the world" through evangelical 
religion, television, daytime sleep, or drugs.231 In her interviews, 
White found that women like the Head Start mother she describes 
225. See id. at 801; see also J.G. MacDonald, Predictors of Treatment Outcome for Alco-
holic Women, 22 INTL. J. ADDICTION 235 (1987). 
226. MacDonald, supra note 225. One researcher found a strong relationship between 
social support and the length of time women who had received treatment remained abstinent 
from alcohol and other drugs. See Blume, supra note 214, at 802 (discussing B.E. Havassy et 
al., Social Support and Relapse To Tobacco, Alcohol and Opiates, in PROBLEMS OF DRUG 
DEPENDENCE 1987 (National Institute on Drug Abuse, Research Monograph No. 76, 1987)). 
227. One expert has explained that 
[s]exism and its consequences (for example: unequal societal roles, undervaluation 
of women's contributions to societal and family functioning, underemployment, and in-
adequate pay) should be explored in relationship to the experience of the chemically 
dependent woman. It is important that the treating professional not measure success 
only in terms of adjustment to the societal stereotype of the female role, because in 
doing so he/she may help the patient avoid confronting her feelings about individuality 
and independence and thereby miss the best possible opportunity to enlarge the range of 
conscious choices about her life. This narrow "adjustment" goal may also fail to raise 
self-esteem •.•• 
Blume, supra note 214, at 801. 
228. On the special treatment needs of lesbians, see S.C. Anderson & D.C. Henderson, 
Working with Lesbian Alcoholics, 30 SOCIAL WORK 518 (1985); D.L. Diamond & S.C. Wtl-
snack, Alcohol Abuse Among Lesbians: A Descriptive Study, 4 J. HoMOSEXUAUTY 123 
(1978). 
229. Some of the special treatment needs of African American women have been de-
scribed in C.S. Carter, Treatment of the Chemically Dependent Black Female: A Cultural 
Perspective, 5 CoUNsELOR 16 {1987). 
230. White, supra note 12, at 1995. 
231. Id. 
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know about the dangers of addictive drugs, both for themselves and 
their children. She concludes that "[t]hese lives are not being lost 
through ignorance, or carelessness, or a will to die. Rather, from 
[the Head Start mother's] perspective, people in her position must 
sometimes risk their lives in order to seek relief from their pain. "232 
The clear message here, and the message in much of the literature 
on the special treatment needs of impoverished chemically depen-
dent women, is that substantial attention must be paid to the social 
context in which they live. Certainly, unhealthy family and commu-
nity relationships can contribute to the problem of substance abuse, 
but effective responses are unlikely unless they, too, are built out of 
the web of affiliations that surround each individual. 
Professor White concludes her article by suggesting that, in ad-
dition to the self-defeating coping strategies she found among her 
interviewees, they also, on occasion, demonstrated the ability to 
build organic groups within the social spaces created by Head 
Start.233 It is within these groups that the women of Head Start 
may undertake the difficult work of sharing, and responding to, 
their common experiences of subordination. This is not the mere 
telling of "war stories," but rather the beginning of a process of 
healing and empowerment in which participants explore the social 
world they inhabit,234 including not only the anxieties and degrada-
232. Id. at 1997. 
233. Id. at 2001. 
234. In some important respects this group work is akin to what feminist writers describe 
as "consciousness-raising." See generally Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist The-
ory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL Eouc. 3, 9 (1988) ("What were experienced as personal hurts 
individually suffered reveal themselves as a collective experience of oppression."); catharine 
MacKinnon, Feminist Discourse, Moral Values and the Law - A Conversation, 34 BUFF. L. 
REv. 11, 85-91 (1985) (consciousness-raising helps "women experienc[e] the walls that have 
contained them as walls"); see also supra note 208. 
A key element in these feminist accounts, and equally important to the suggestion in text 
that Head Start may offer a site for similar work on the part of chemically dependent parents, 
is the notion that discovering common experience can often help participants.to begin a more 
affirmative course of conduct. As Christine Littleton has put it: 
Shared experience, the substance of which consciousness raising is the method, is more 
than the aggregate of individual experiences, different in kind from their overlap. There 
is, in addition to the recognition of diversity and regularity, the experience of shared 
experience. This second level, or meta-experience, is what constructs women as an oppo-
sitional class. 
Christine Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes, 41 STAN. L. REV. 
751, 784 (1989). Of course, other writers, most notably Angela Harris, have criticized these 
descriptions of feminist method on the grounds that they adopt an "essentialist view" of 
women, or a view that ascribes an essential meaning to gender that transcends other charac-
teristics such as race, class, sexual orientation, and the like. See Angela Harris, Categorical 
Discourse and Dominance Theory, 5 BERKELEY WoMEN's LJ. 181 (1990). One need not, 
however, view the methodology of consciousness raising as necessarily essentialist. "Rather, 
through consciousness-raising practices ••. and exclusion questions, a heterogeneous group 
of women may discover not only points of surprising commonality but a bundle of surprising 
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tion of poverty, racism, and sexism, but also the self-destructive re-
actions produced by a life lived alone and in social isolation.235 
The suggestion here is that a mechanical application of the con-
fidentiality statutes and regulations to the Head Start setting, by 
wrapping individual parents in a legally constructed shroud of pri-
vacy, poses the danger of alienating those parents from the very 
resource that may be most effective in helping them grapple with 
their chemical dependency. That resource, of course, is the set of 
relationships that, taken together, make up each parent's commu-
nity. The law governing this area, when interpreted in traditional 
terms, understands chemical dependency as a particularistic, indi-
vidualized problem with little or no social dimension. As such, the 
law is designed to operate within an institutional setting that is also 
highly particular and individualized. On the other hand, at least 
some measure of the alcoholism and drug addiction present among 
Head Start families can be more productively understood as a prob-
lem that transcends the individual parent or staff member. More 
effective interventions may depend upon the adoption of methodol-
ogies that draw in a number of linked individuals. In light of these 
observations, a modification of the traditional approach to confi-
dentiality may be in order. 
There are, of course, significant dangers lurking within this pro-
posed course. The decision to replace legal entitlement, individual 
consent, and contractual obligation with vulnerability, informality, 
and trust is an especially risky undertaking when participants have 
conflicting interests or unequal power. For example, an addicted 
parent's interest in retaining custody of her or his child may be in 
direct conflict with a Head Start teacher's interest in safeguarding 
that child's physical or emotional well-being in cases where neglect 
or abuse is suspected. 
differences." Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and 
Clinical Education, 15 MINN. L. REv. 1599, 1629 (1991) (citation omitted). 
235. In Professor White's words, these women 
find ways to come together, searching out spaces where they can let down their guard. 
In those fleeting social spaces, they rage about the binds they are caught in, and hold on 
to each other, and laugh. They begin to voice their hopes for themselves and their chil-
dren, and to imagine the bold actions that might realize those dreams. But above all, it 
is in those spaces that poor women feel safe enough to remember - to name the shame 
and violence that they confront every day in the public world . . • • I have seen women 
create such space within the institutional interstices of the Head Start program. Through 
the force of their imagination, they have seen this program not as one more social ser-
vice bureaucracy, but rather as an opportunity to make community among them-
selves ...• They have transformed the Head Start program into "homeplace," an 
institution in which they feel safe to speak out about their own experiences of pain. 
White, supra note 12, at 2001. 
2374 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 93:2325 
As a number of feminist writers have shown, dominant actors 
can easily subvert informal. decisional or dispute resolution 
processes when participants do not stand on an equal footing, and 
these informal processes can strengthen or perpetuate existing ineq-
uities.236 While a liberal, rights-based approach may fail to take ac-
count of existing relationships, an unrestrained communitarian 
strategy does not allow for law's potential to foster individuals' 
sense of autonomy and control over their lives, and to help define 
healthy relationships between the individual and her community.237 
In the end, neither a liberal legal approach nor an unrestrained 
communitarian alternative, taken alone, is likely to be satisfactory. 
While they may be in tension, autonomy and affiliation need not be 
treated as mutually exclusive.23s Indeed, it may be possible to de-
vise a set of practical solutions in which the recognition of legal 
rights occurs pursuant to a dialogue between involved actors, and in 
which those holding legal entitlements and those owing legal re-
sponsibilities are defined expansively so that the underlying human 
context is maintained and reinforced.239 
CONCLUSION 
In his work on the role of rights in the welfare bureaucracy, Wil-
liam Simon has suggested that social work theory as it developed in 
the first half of the twentieth century held out the promise of recon-
ciling rights and relationships.240 Simon shows that theorists under-
stood individual client autonomy to be a product of social 
interaction, so that effective social work practice required staff to 
engage with clients and assist them in identifying goals and develop-
ing strategies to meet those goals.241 Simon explains that within 
this conception, legal rights need not function as "conversation 
236. See Lisa G. Lennan, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Infor-
mal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARv. WOMEN'S LJ. 57 (1984); Janet Rifkin, Mediation 
from a Feminist Perspective: Promise and Problems, 2 LAW & INEQUALITY 21 (1984); see also 
THE PoUTics OF INFORMAL JUSTICE (Richard Abel ed., 1982); Richard Abel, Informalism: 
A Tactical Equivalent to Law?, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 375 (1985); William H. Simon, 
Legal Informality and Redistributive Politics, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 384 (1985). 
237. Indeed, as Patricia Williams and other critical race theorists have shown, the rhetoric 
of individual legal entitlement has a special symbolic power in our culture that, for 
subordinate groups, has fueled political movements of considerable empowering potential. 
See Patricia Wtlliams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals From Deconstructed Rights, 
22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401 (1987). 
238. See Rhode, supra note 163, at 628. 
239. See Handler, supra note 143, at 1090-91. 
240. See Simon, supra note 159, at 14-17. 
241. See id. at 17. 
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trumps, ending conversations,"242 but may be "regenerative," by 
which he means that they can foster a dialogue regarding the cli-
ent's needs and circumstances.243 As a result, Simon concludes that 
this process of asserting legal rights could serve to enhance a cli-
ent's self-respect and dignity.244 
Recognizing client autonomy as "a goal, rather than ... a prem-
ise"245 is a critical step in moving away from a dichotomized analy-
sis in which individual legal entitlement is understood as 
incompatible with affiliation. Nevertheless, calibrating the tension 
between autonomy and relationship - between legal rights and en-
gaged trust - requires the application of what Katharine Bartlett 
has called "practical reasoning." She describes the approach in the 
following terms: 
Practical reasoning approaches problems not as dichotomized con-
flicts, but as dilemmas with multiple perspectives, contradictions, and 
inconsistencies. These dilemmas, ideally, do not call for the choice of 
one principle over another, but rather "imaginative integrations and 
reconciliations," which require attention to particular context.246 
This practical approach allows those involved to build solutions 
with the assistance of legal prescription rather than according to the 
abstract application of preexisting, generalized rules. Because rules 
"represent accumulated past wisdom," and "check the inclination 
to be arbitrary . . . 'in situations in which bias and passion might 
distort judgment,' "247 they have value within this process. Because 
past wisdom may reflect the norms of a community other than the 
one to which the rules are to be applied, however, Bartlett's practi-
cal reasoning demands that "perspectives not represented in the 
dominant culture" be identified so that the rules can be recon-
figured to serve the needs of those whose interests are at stake.248 
This acknowledgement of the partial, contested nature of legal per-
spectives then opens up the possibility that law can be applied to 
people without transforming them into fully abstracted legal 
subjects. 
242. Id. at 15; see also Handler, supra note 143, at 1096. 
243. Simon, supra note 159, at 16-17. 
244. "Teaching the [welfare] claimant to regard herself as a right-holder was a means of 
enhancing her self-confidence and dignity." Id. at 20. 
245. Id. at 16. 
246. Bartlett, supra note 208, at 851 (citation omitted). 
247. Id. at 852-53 (quoting MAR1HA NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGIUTY OF GOODNESS: LUCK 
AND ETHICS IN GREEK TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 305 {1986)). 
248. Id. at 855. 
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With respect to the application of the federal confidentiality 
laws and regulations to Head Start, this process of tailoring legal 
prescriptions may require that the law regard families, rather than 
individual parents, as rights-holders, and that it understand a "pro-
gram" to include the recipients of services as well as those provid-
ing those services. In many instances, the responsibility to protect 
the privacy of parents suffering from addiction or alcoholism may 
fall as heavily upon other parents as it does upon paid staff. De-
pending on the particular history and experiences of those involved · 
in the activities of any given Head Start center, the use of formal 
rights and full due process may serve to reinforce this shared re-
sponsibility, or it may undermine it. 
The important point, however, is that each Head Start center 
will be different. Introducing formal legal rights to confidentiality, 
and malting the application of those rights a part of the ongoing 
dialogue within a given community in order to foster both individ-
ual autonomy and a sense of responsibility for others is essential. 
Heeding the feminist directive to engage in contextual decision-
maldng will mean confronting the tensions inherent in this effort, 
and will require legal doctrine to be reconceived in the light of spe-
cific, concrete local cultures. Each center must find a different ac-
commodation between preexisting practices and the strictures set 
out in the federal laws and regulations. This is a process that can 
only be accomplished in the hundreds of church basements and 
school auditoriums in which the hard and important work of Head 
Start takes place. 
